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Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 4/81)



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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

POLITICAL WILL NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT MAGHREBIAN SOLIDARITY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 17

[Article by Moncef Guen of Tunisia, Dr of Economic Sciences, ex-President of the Economic and Social Council: "This United Maghreb, Which Depends On No One But Us"]

[Text] To talk about Maghreb when Libyans, Algerians and Moroccans confront each other on a bit of desert, may appear utopian.

But, the Maghrebian solidarity [movement] has a strong appeal. There's no need here to recall the common fight against the colonial invader; various attempts to organize this solidarity after independence, especially in 1958; the daily bonds which unite the populations around artificial borders, which are, consequently, permeable. It suffices to note two recent events: First when, by a mere administrative decision, the Algerian Government allowed the influx of Algerian tourists to Tunisia, second, the construction of the oil pipeline across Tunisia, allowed that country to support itself on an energy basis of Algerian origin.

Creative Diversity

Some estimate that the previous policy is indispensable. But, it is the best way to alienate some against the others, government officials and the people will not allow interference, not even from brothers. It is in our diversity, a creative but interdependent diversity that we should look for support points for our unity. Maghreb of the States of Maghreb of the people? What good are slogans if the states feel sufficiently popular!

What our people and, more particularly, what our youth demand is not extraordinary. They demand that the officials also be practical in the Maghrebian approach and that they attempt to be practical in their national actions.

What they want is that when we should buy foreign goods the advantage be given to Maghreb; when we sell goods abroad, preference should be given to Maghreb; when we deal abroad we should close ranks; when we invest we should reason on the Maghrebian scale; when we educate we should inspire common values.

Harmonizing

It is undeniable that it is on the economic and cultural levels that the horizons are opened for Maghreb. On the commercial level the changes can be considerably

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developed if a common customs takes form, progressively. The advantage of such a formula is that, according to a predetermined calendar, it will allow the establishment of a zone where the movement of goods and services will be liberated. The common customs will be preferable to a freeport zone. Firstly, because it is superior to the freeport on the course of economic integration. And secondly, it will allow the uniformization of customs processing of goods of foreign origin. It will be a decisive step towards the creation of a common market.

With the subsequent harmonizing of macroeconomic policies, a true economic union could be solidified on a market of more than 70 million consumers with the most elevated per capita income in Africa.

Integration in a single economic plank will be accomplished when the budgetary, monetary and investing policies become uniform.

What will aid the acceleration of this process are strong factors of cultural class cohesion. We, Maghrebians, speak the same language, we practice the same religion, we have the same customs, we aspire to the same ideals. We should bring forth these elements of cultural unity by adopting common programs of education; by favoring contacts between our universities, student and experience exchange; by putting our technological resources to the service of the society we want to create; by forming ascending generations in the Maghrebian discipline.

Second Wind

It is certain that the Tunisian prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, by dedicating his first official trips to Morocco and Algeria, successfully, has powerfully raised the Maghrebian ideal. These visits restore a tone which our solidarity has lacked for a long time. It is in the pursuit of this fruitful dialogue, the elaboration of precise programs of cooperation, the untiringly follow up to their realization and the responses of mass organizations that we will see if the 20 years which have just elapsed will help make the Maghrebians sufficiently superior to become self-confident.

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

STORY OF LIBYAN LIQUIDATION OF IMAM AL-SADR RELATED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 12-18 Dec 80 pp 28, 29

[Article: "The Full Story of the Liquidation of Musa al-Sadr and His Two Comrades"]

[Text] After many stories and tales have been repeated on the killing of Imam Musa al-Sadr, after a long period of time has elapsed in which a game of nerves has gone on against the partisans of Musa al-Sadr and his supporters in Lebanon, and after numerous attempts have been made to conceal the true criminal, one can present the full details on this crime today.

The date: 18 July 1978.

The place: The embassy of the Libyan Jamahiriya in Algeria.

On that day, the telephone rang. On one end was an official in the embassy, and on the other Mr 'Isam Makki.

A pleasant conversation took place between the two.

'Isam Makki said that he was representing Imam Musa al-Sadr and speaking on his behalf, transmitting the imam's desire to visit Libya.

The official in the embassy was confused. He said: "All I can do is cable Tripoli transmitting this desire. I wish you would leave me your telephone number so I can contact you as soon as the answer arrives."

The conversation ended at that point, and the imam's representative in Algiers continued to await the embassy's response. However, instead of going to Algeria, the Libyan response went by way of Beirut; the charge d'affaires in the embassy of the Libyan Jamahiriya in Beirut contacted Imam Musa al-Sadr and informed him that the Libyan government would welcome his visit. Indeed, more than that, the government hoped that that visit would take place as soon as possible.

The imam asked for some time to study the issue and promised to inform the charge d'affaires of the date of the visit as soon as he decided on it.

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Two days passed in which Musa al-Sadr discussed the issues he wanted to discuss with Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi with the staff of the Shiite council. He then got in touch with the charge d'affaires and told him that he would like to visit Libya in the second half of the month of Ramadan.

After a discussion by telephone, agreement was made to set the date of 25 July 1978 for the trip.

On that day, Imam Musa al-Sadr went to Beirut international airport. Accompanying him to Libya were Mr Muhammad Ya'qub and the journalist 'Abbas Badr-Din.

Reception before the Meeting

Meeting him at the airport were Mr Nazzar Farahat, charge d'affaires of the Lebanese embassy in Tripoli.

The Lebanese charge d'affaires told the imam that he had received news of the visit from the Libyan Foreign Ministry.

Imam al-Sadr, his two comrades, and those who met them went from the airport to the Coast Hotel, where they stayed as official guests of the Libyan government.

On the evening of 27 August 1978, an official dinner party was held in the imam's honor.

During the party, the imam inquired about a date for meeting with Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi.

The reply came that the date would be set soon, because the colonel wanted to meet him as soon as possible.

The dinner party ended but the imam did not manage to learn what the expression "as soon as possible" might mean. He whispered into the ears of persons close to him that he was afraid the statement could mean a week's wait before the meeting took place.

Are You a Coward?

Two days elapsed after the dinner party, and Imam Musa al-Sadr received a telephone call informing him that the date for the meeting had been set at 31 August.

The imam began to prepare for this meeting and arrange the subjects he would discuss with Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi. The fighting in Lebanon was heated and no ray of hope of a total armistice appeared. It was necessary that al-Qadhafi take part in trying to resolve some positions. Therefore, the imam's visit to Libya was more than necessary, and to that end more than one party had encouraged it and helped arrange it. Syrian personalities and prominent leaders in the Liberation Organization participated in preparing this meeting. They encouraged Imam Musa al-Sadr to meet with Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi.

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31 August came and the meeting took place.

From the start of the meeting, a dispute in views and in evaluations of positions emerged.

An unfriendly atmosphere dominated the meeting.

Then voices and pitches rose.

al-Qadhdhafi proposed to Imam al-Sadr that the AMAL organization launch a religious revolution to take power in Lebanon; al-Qadhdhafi expressed the Libyan Jamahiriyyah readiness to finance such a revolution and support it militarily.

However, Imam al-Sadr immediately ventured ~~fundamentally~~ to reject this notion. He declared clearly and decisively that he refused to use the AMAL organization to carry out an action which was not consonant with its goals. He expressed the impossibility of carrying out such a goal in Lebanon and described it as a ruse and a trap set against the AMAL organization itself.

When the conversation had reached that point, Col al-Qadhdhafi exploded in wrath and cried out in a loud voice:

"you are afraid. You are a coward. You are not fit to be a leader of the Shiites in Lebanon."

Liquidation of the Imam and His Two Colleagues

When the conversation reached this degree of tension and disputatiousness, Imam al-Sadr found that continuing the meeting was fruitless and therefore decided to shorten the conversation and reduce the time remaining in the meeting.

When he and his two comrades emerged from the Libyan president's place, the imam whispered to his two companions:

"As we emerge we are bearing a deep wound. We have been treated with contempt and have not achieved any goal at all from this meeting."

Some distance from the imam and his comrades was standing Capt Bashir Sa'd secretary of military affairs in Col al-Qadhdhafi's office.

Capt Sa'd had attended al-Qadhdhafi's meeting with imam and his two companions and had observed the colonel's excited reaction to the imam's answers from close at hand.

It appears that Capt Sa'd heard Col al-Qadhdhafi mutter something he could not make out.

Relying on the principle of giving personal interpretations to the colonel's mutterings, Capt Bashir Sa'd interpreted these mutterings as the desire on the colonel's part to get rid of Imam Musa al-Sadr and those who were with him.

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As a result, he suggested to the 1st Lt Faraj Abu Ghaliqah (an officer in the office of the chief of military intelligence) that the imam and his two comrades be liquidated.

1st Lt Abu Ghaliyah hastened to execute these orders. He took the imam and his two comrades off in three Peugeot 504 cars (the first black and the other two white), which had been waiting outside the building.

From there Abu Ghaliyah took them to a military area 9 kilometers west of Tripoli known as Janzur which is used as a firing range.

At Janzur four noncommissioned officers who had accompanied 1st Lt Abu Ghaliyah carried out the order given them to execute Imam al-Sadr and his two comrades.

The three were buried at the same range where they were killed!

When the news was conveyed to Col al-Qadhdhafi that his orders to liquidate the unwanted guests had been carried out, panic seized him, his nerves failed him and a great upset overwhelmed him. He declared that he had not issued such an order.

In the midst of his disturbance and upset, he issued an immediate order that the instrument of the execution, 1st Lt Faraj Abu Ghaliyah, and the four noncommissioned officers who had executed al-Sadr and his two companions be arrested.

Some officers tried to mediate with Col al-Qadhdhafi to change his mind, on grounds that Abu Ghaliyah and his group had just carried out the orders given to them and that they had considered the colonel's orders "revolutionary decrees in the service of the nation and the revolution."

However, al-Qadhdhafi insisted on arresting Abu Ghaliyah and his group, expelled everyone from his room, sat down on the couch across from his desk, and immersed himself in deep thought on the new crisis in which he had become engulfed.

A Makeup Operation

The only idea which occurred to Col al-Qadhdhafi as he was contemplating the ceiling of the room in his office in search of a solution was to seek the aid of Lt Col Mustafa al-Kharrubi, the man in charge of general intelligence.

al-Qadhdhafi asked his secretary immediately to get in touch with Lt Col al-Kharrubi and summon him urgently on a very important matter.

In a quarter hour, Col al-Qadhdhafi and Lt Col al-Kharrubi were looking at one another and a question was growing and growing between them:

What to do?

An idea flashed in Lt Col al-Kharrubi's mind. He said,

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"A plane belonging to the Alitalia company is leaving today for Rome. We must put three persons who are disguised as the imam and his two companions on board this airplane and send them all to Rome, so that when the news of their disappearance is known we can say that they left Libya and disappeared or were kidnapped in Rome."

Col al-Qadhafi agreed to the idea without hesitation. Lt Col al-Kharrubi hastened to carry out the idea.

At the hotel, he collected the suitcases of the imam and his two companions and everything belonging to them, especially the passports.

He ordered his assistants to provide three people and perform the makeup necessary to make them look like the imam and his two comrades.

He then ordered three first class seats be reserved on Alitalia's Flight 881 to Rome.

In a few minutes, Lt Col al-Kharrubi's secretary came in to inform him that Alitalia had apologized for failing to provide the three seats, since there was only one empty one in first class. He could only tell him,

"That doesn't concern me. I want three first class seats on this flight in the name of the imam and his two comrades. Arrange to detain two passengers -- any two passengers."

The intelligence men laboriously studied the passenger list. Among the passengers they found two Italians, Mr Valentini (an employee of an Italian firm working in Tripoli) and Mr Don Silone, who was accompanying him.

Orders were issued to cancel the two persons' reservations because they were wanted for investigation. They were in fact detained for investigation.

These two men still do not know the charge for which they were detained for 24 hours before being allowed to leave Libya for Italy.

Thus the way was paved for the three imposters disguised as Imam al-Sadr and his two companions to board the plane.

To reassure himself further, Lt Col al-Kharrubi went to Tripoli airport to make it appear, on the one hand, that he had come to say goodbye to these important persons, and on the other hand to ascertain that the makeup was proper and that matters were proceeding as they should.

When the Alitalia airplane took off from Tripoli airport, Lt Col al-Kharrubi rushed to his car and spoke to the colonel in his office by radio, telling him:

"Everything is complete. The airplane has taken off and we have now moved the ball into the Italian court."

When the colonel asked him:

"Have you taken specific measures in Rome?"

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- Lt Col al-Kharrubi answered,

"Instructions have been issued to Lt Muhammad al-Rubati (the intelligence official in the Libyan embassy in Italy) to complete the remaining procedures."

The Fantastic Stories Collapse

The expression of anxiety and bewilderment disappeared from Col al-Qadhdhafi's face: the matter had been arranged in a manner which would eliminate all charges which could be directed against Libya and against him personally.

What, however, might happen if the issue becomes complicated in the media?

Here the colonel requested intelligence, media and foreign agencies to fabricate fantastic stories about the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his two companions, deal with every emergency which might appear in this context, prepare statements in an attempt to be rid of the blood of the imam and his two companions, to engage in flexibility (and bargain) with the Shiite factional leaders in Lebanon, and to mobilize personnel in Lebanon for this purpose. He issued an authorization to the Libyan embassy in Lebanon to spend unlimited amounts in this regard.

Thus some spokesmen and writers in Lebanon and Iran were recruited to propagate the Libyan version of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in Libya.

Two years after the various contradictory concocted stories, the facts have begun to be discovered, ripping apart all the veils of the old stories. The imam and his two comrades were liquidated in Libya, in a military area named Janzur, 2 years ago!

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ALGERIA

BEN BELLA FREE, PLANS POLITICAL COMEBACK

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 pp 31-33

/Article: "What Future Awaits Him? Today Ben Bella Plans To Start His Second Political Life"/

/Text/ The people who were there did not believe their eyes. At 1100 hours in the morning of the 26th anniversary of the outbreak of the war of liberation in Algeria (1 November 1954), one of the main leaders of this war, the first president of independent Algeria, and the most senior political prisoner in the world, in the third world in particular - Ahmad Ben Bella, returned to life. It is not a common thing in this world that a political prisoner of this class should return to life after such a long absence, but the miracle happened, if only for once. At 1100 hours in the morning this 1 November, the door of the villa in Msila, about 250 kilometers east of the capital, opened and Ben Bella made his first free steps before the threshold of the villa so that some photographers in attendance could take commemorative pictures of him and so that the contents of the speech Chadli Bendjedid gave on the eve of the anniversary, when he told his people that the last and most prominent political prisoner in the Algerian nation had become free under his orders, could be confirmed. Ben Bella had been staying in the villa, which belonged to his wife's family, since 4 July 1979, when President Chadli took the first step in releasing him and lessened the restrictions imposed on him.

The first rapid appearance of Ben Bella was effective and successful -- a throng of old friends, fighting men and young people were around the door to the house. His wife Zahra, in the peak of her joy and exultation, could hardly believe this blessing which she had long dreamed of since she had decided to join her husband in this difficult course when they were married in his prison in 1971. Zahra was brimming with vitality on the morning of that day, going back and forth to greet the well-wishers with whom the villa was packed and preparing journalists for a quick appearance by her husband; we would not be exaggerating if we said that Zahra Salami, the obscure journalist who became Mrs Ben Bella in the harshest and most difficult of circumstances, has also entered on every lip and tongue in Algeria, and that regarding her history will record that she helped save the first president of independent Algeria from the clutches of isolation, gave him two daughters by adoption, and in the last 10 years created around him something close to a family life which raised his morale and made him stick more tenaciously to life and the future.

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A Young Man Despite the Years of Prison

Ben Bella is taking his first free steps, and everyone is amazed at the youth and vitality appearing in him, as if these last 20 years are not in fact to be counted as part of his life. The step still is elegant and the gaze is still penetrating. Zahra hurries alongside him, invites journalists and calls her daughter Mahdia "arwahi ya Mahdia" - that is, come - so that the unique family circle could be complete before the journalists and the world. One of the journalists asks him, "What will you be doing now? Will you go back to politics?" The answer is given at once: "I will venture on any subject at all now. That is a commitment I made to myself. My freedom is complete but I want to think quietly about what I should do in the future."

Another journalist asks him, "Are you really free?" The answer comes assertively, "Yes, I am completely free, without any restrictions whatever."

A Spanish journalist approaches the group. Zahra calls him and Ben Bella greets him in Spanish. Up to now he has been using French in his conversation with the first group of journalists that has managed to approach him after this long seclusion:

"I came out to greet you out of a commitment on my part to the rules of etiquette, but I have no statements now."

Everyone appreciates this noble signal from the most senior political prisoner in the world, who still retains such a degree of magnanimity.

The only thing which the first group of journalists to meet the free Ben Bella could ascertain was that "the former president," as was stated in the decree of his release for the first time since the coup against him, would at the outset make a visit to the grave of his mother who dies about 8 years ago without seeing him.

Ben Bella Goes Back to Moghnia

In addition, Ben Bella determinedly tied up his luggage in order to move out of the villa where he had been confined in the town of Msila southeast of the Algerian capital.

The former president, Ahmad Ben Bella, told a number of his close friends that he would move to his birthplace, the town of Moghnia near the Algerian-Moroccan border, at the outset. There he would busy himself planning his movements for the future for a number of weeks. He has not yet decided whether he will move from his birthplace to the capital itself or to one of its suburbs, although it is certain that his stay in Moghnia will be a temporary, transitory one.

It is well known that the decree on the complete release of independent Algeria's first president after the triumph of its revolution was postponed from 1 November 1979 to 30 October 1980, from the date President Chadli Bendjedid had set in a direct conversation he held with Algerian journalist last year. It was bruited about that this 1-year delay in the implementation of this decree could be attributed to the emergence of disputes between President Bendjedid and a number of political bureau and government members over his well-known policy of political liberali-

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zation and a review of the socio-economic experiment after the death of the late President Houari Boumediene. These disputes were resolved - in favor of President Bendjedid; thereby, a number of Algerian officials were removed from the political bureau and government, and the command agencies of the Liberation Front party and the government were rearranged in accordance with the political liberalization policy and the review of the experiment.

Thus the former president, Ahmad Ben Bella, returns to freedom in a new social and political atmosphere different from that in which he was arrested in the term of the late president, Boumediene, after a total absence of more than 15 consecutive years from the political scene in the country.

Perhaps this is the first time - not only in Algeria but also in the whole Arab world - that an Arab leader has been granted circumstances to begin a new life for himself after the twilight of his first brilliant life in his country and his fall from the presidency, which lasted from the triumph of the revolution of a million and a half martyrs in 1961 to 1965.

What will Ben Bella do with his new life?

A Book Waiting To Be Published

It is clear that Ben Bella himself has not yet revealed his plans in this regard. All one has been able to see of these plans is his determination to publish "a book on autogestion" which totals more than a thousand pages and which he reviews criticism and analyses of his policy and his positions as a fighting man, official and prisoner and his view of the current situation and the future.

It is well known that Ben Bella actually offered his book to a French publisher and that it was to be published in a few months. However, he has just requested him to suspend publication. Conflicting reasons are given for refraining from publishing the book, among them that the publisher asked that some details which were not essential from his viewpoint be abbreviated but that that did not meet with Ben Bella's approval; that "friends" advised Ben Bella not to venture to publish the French version lest Arabs read his book in an imprecise translation from the French; and finally that President Bedjedid asked him not to publish the book before issuance of the decree on his full release so that his adversaries would not exploit it to obstruct the process of carrying out the decree.

In any case Ben Bella has been careful not to respond directly or explicitly to the question "what will you be doing with your new life and what are you preparing for the future?" However, at the same time, he has not hesitated to declare his opinion, from time to time, in meetings at his headquarters in Msila with his friends and Algerian compatriots. The opinions he has expressed have produced contradictory reactions; some consider them a symbol of the political and intellectual maturity of the former president, after the long period of reflection and study in prison, and some rebuke him for regressing from his former positions and views on the Arab socialist and nationalist revolution to what is called the Islamic revolution.

However, the question on Ben Bella's new life and future poses itself insistently in Algeria, the Maghreb in general, the Arab nation and the whole world, and various answers and possibilities arise over the question.

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There is unanimity among observers of various tendencies on Ben Bella's point of departure toward the future in his new life. That is that the former president, by virtue of his combative struggle and his nature, which is characterized by positiveness and boldness, cannot be satisfied by the life of a "former retired president" or the position of a theoretical politician-thinker who squats in an ivory tower of his own choice, contemplating, criticizing, writing history and giving advice without venturing into the sea of politics.

According to a view expressed by someone close to him "Si Ahmad is a political fish who can live only in the sea of politics and struggle, even if he is given total freedom and total glorification."

Most recently, at the start of the flareup of the Iraqi-Iranian war, it was related that he said "The first act I will perform when freed is immediately to travel to Tehran and Baghdad to work to stop the war and establish peace and brotherhood between the two fraternal Moslem countries." However, when the decree for his total release was issued at the end of the last month, he made a further decision to re-study the subject of the Iranian-Iraqi struggle in greater depth, following the development of events and the emergence of their deep-seated historic complexities and serious complications, and would need time before embarking on a step on this road.

The proper question regarding Ben Bella's future is not whether his new life will be political or non-political, but rather "what political life will he choose?"

The Release Is Followed by Support

Some of these possibilities are based on the assumption that the full release of Ben Bella was not easy and that President Bendjedid was compelled to delay implementing his promise of this release for a full year, which he spent resolving intense struggles within the political leadership in the party, the government and the armed forces over his policy of political liberalization and his review of the negative features of the Boumediene experiment. One of these struggles was the issue of giving of Ben Bella his full freedom as a citizen.

People who consider this possibility are inclined to believe that a complete political agreement must have been signed between President Bendjedid and the former president Ben Bella that the latter would not venture on a political movement or take positions outside the scope of the regime. Some of these people tend to believe that the agreement went further, including a commitment on Ben Bella's part to put all his weight on the side of President Bendjedid and his policy, a policy to whose general support Ben Bella alluded during his residence in the town of Msila in talking with his visitors, and when persons performing the prayer greeted him at this first Friday prayer after he settled in Msila with salutations, when he raised his hand in greeting and replied "greetings to Algeria."

The people who stress this possibility consider that President Bendjedid needs Ben Bella's support and historic weight, which still have relative significance in the Algerian conscience, in confronting the "group of hard-line Boumedienists" who say that President Chadli's policy of reviewing the experiment is in reality a regression from the socialist experiment.

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In another area, Ben Bella has an interest in rounding out President Chadli's victory over the group of hard-line Boumedienists for the sake of his political future. Thus common ground for cooperation between the first president and the third president of Algeria exists - but how will the cooperation take place?

A recommendation is being bruited about that the party and National Assembly grant the former president an honorary political title, such as "first citizen" or "father of the Algerian revolution," which his combative history and status will retain for him, and that his advice be taken on essential political decisions, although he himself not work directly in this political field.

There is another recommendation which has been bruited about since Ben Bella's partial release on 4 July 1979. One of the causes of the struggle which went on in the political bureau of the Liberation Front Party was that the bureau had called for an emergency party meeting in which Ben Bella would be elected honorary president of the party for life out of appreciation for his long combative history. The recommendation was raised again after the political bureau was purged of people opposing the political liberalization policy and the reelected President Bendjedid was leading. It is not yet known whether Bendjedid and Ben Bella agreed over perpetuation of the unified political structure of the Liberation Front Party as it was or agreed to change it in a manner permitting a proliferation of currents and political platforms within the party in conformity with the new policy of liberalization. One of the clearest opinions which former president Ben Bella expressed after his temporary release was his direct criticism of the Liberation Front Party and its role following the independence of Algeria and the triumph of the revolution. Although he considered that the united Liberation Front political organization was necessary during the revolution, he concluded, following the experiment, that "After independence we removed the shingle of the front and replaced it with the shingle of the party. However, the party was weak and the weakness remained, becoming just a shingle with no life behind it, and we consequently lost its influential leading role. Why? We did not study this problem with the necessary seriousness. Some trends call for pluralism. Is that possible or necessary for democracy? Where will the place for it be? Inside the party or outside it? Is it necessary for us to perpetuate the form of the party, or must we change it so that it includes the form and organizational format of the front? These are questions I asked myself for 14 years and I am asking them again now. I do not claim that I have categorical ready answers." However, at the end he is concerned to summarize his position with care and accuracy, saying "In general, I have a group of preliminary ideas for discussion. They are a matter which only the people themselves will resolve."

Among the possible expected responses on Ben Bella's future in his new political life is that he will start rearranging and collecting what are known in the Algerian context as the "Benbellien forces." These, in Ben Bella's first life, before his fall from the presidency and his arrest were a mixture of numerous tendencies proceeding from the premise of interaction and concurrence between Arabhood and socialism. They included Islamic and national socialist elements, especially Trotskyist currents, among whose most prominent proponents was the well-known Algerian thinker Mohamed Houbi Ouezzan, in addition to Mehsas and Bechir el-Hadj Ali, representatives of the national socialist current, and the late Malek Bennabi, the well known Islamic thinker. However, outside the context of the point of interaction between Arabhood

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and socialism, the method for building the party, relations between it and the government in general and the army and particular, the notion of Arabhood, and the criteria for international relations, especially with France, the Soviet Union and America, have been intense.

In Ben Bella's first political life after independence, a clash occurred between him and a number of historic leaders of the likes of Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohamed Boudiaf and Karim Belkacem concerning democracy, the establishment of national unity and the most appropriate ways of building socialism. This led to bloody clashes which were resolved by the intervention of the army under Boumediene's command on Ben Bella's behalf. That was followed by a clash between Ben Bella and Mohamed Khider who attracted the support of the Islamic forces against what were known as "the forces of the left and imported socialism" in Algeria, then finally by the decisive struggle between Ben Bella and the army on the issue of the relationship of the party to the army and the combatants who were raised in its embrace. The army rejected the establishment of a parallel party military organization under the name of the popular militia to protect socialist achievements, especially the experiment of autogestion, against the forces of reaction and apostasy against the revolution. That clash led to the removal of President Ben Bella on 19 June 1965.

The Question now deals with the identity and reality of these "Benbellien" forces today, 15 years after the end of Ben Bella's first political life.

Algerian society witnessed radical changes during Boumediene's term which had effects of differing importance on the Ben Bella forces and their leadership personnel, to the point where some of them veered toward Boumediene in his movement to bring down Ben Bella, foremost among them Col Tahar Zbiri, chief of the war staff of the army, who was the object of Ben Bella's trust and whom he had appointed in early 1965, during the trip Boumediene (who at that time held the position of defense minister) made to the Soviet Union, to oversee and restrict Boumediene's movement and dominance of the army command.

Shortly after, in a few months, he joined Boumediene. He personally forced his way into the home of the former president at dawn in the name of the 19 June movement and arrested him. Then Tahar Zbiri subsequently soon turned against Boumediene and made an unsuccessful attempt at a mutiny to overthrow the regime in December 1967; this ended with his flight abroad. Similarly, Ali Mehsas, minister of agriculture, and Bechir Boumaza, minister of information, differed with Ben Bella and joined Boumediene, then took a position opposed to Boumediene's regime and in favor of rebuilding bridges with Ben Bella; Boumaza ended his exile in Switzerland and started going back and forth to Algeria from time to time, after the partial release of Ben Bella, holding a number of meetings with him. As a result it was said that the two men had reached a joint program for united activity in the context of support for what Boumaza called President Chadli Bendjedid's positive steps.

However, the changes in Algerian society as a result of the experiment in socialist development, the agricultural revolution, and the reconstruction and politicization of the armed forces, the party and the institutions of the government during Boumediene's term gained him overwhelming popularity which appeared in powerful popular mourning at his death. Successive statements by the army, the federation of workers, youth, and women and peasants in the agricultural revolution stressed the need to con-

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tinue along Boumediene's road and adhere to the charter issued in 1975 as a working guide for the Algerian people. These changes caused the Ben Bella forces to lose part of their reserve of support. However, it is necessary, today, in evaluating this stage, to give consideration to the split in the Boumediene forces among what is called the politically moderate liberal wing which is represented by President Chadli, the hard-line wing headed by Mohamed el-Saley Yehyaoui, who was removed from actual party leadership in the latest party and government changes and who seems to enjoy the support of influential groups in the armed forces, and the group of national technical staffs possessing a socialist platform which is headed by Abdesselam Belaid, nicknamed the father of Algerian industrialization, who was also recently removed from the party and is accused of being the person primarily responsible for the errors of the Boumediene experiment.

Thinking with an Islamic Background

On what basis, then, and how can the new organization of Ben Bella forces in Ben Bella's second political life arise?

It is clear that the former president himself has changed many of his political, economic and social ideas and tendencies; although he still believes in the Arabhood and socialism of Algeria, he has started to proceed from a clear Islamic background and in his new political life believes that "Islam is a religion and a government."

Does that orientation mean that he will resume attracting the current religious forces in Algeria, the growth of whose organizations has been observed, after he lost them in his struggle with the late Mohamed Khider, losing the forces of the left and scientific socialism which remained an ally of his in general until his fall in 1965, though some forces remained loyal to him until he was totally released?

What will be the position of Ben Bella's new group, if its organization consists of personnel and forces which differed with him and withdrew their support from him to Boumediene in his move against him, though they later declared opposition to Boumediene?

What will be the position of the popular army and the national technical staffs which have weight in Algerian society on that organization? Their positions contradicted his in the latter part of his term, shortly before he fell, and some of them today have entered into a struggle with the present regime under the leadership of President Chadli Bendjedid.

What will be the position of the historic leaders of the Algerian revolution, who are still leading organized opposition movements inside and outside Algeria, like Mohamed Boudiaf and Hocine Ait Ahmed -- movements which remained opposed to the regime of Ben Bella and Boumediene's regime in an absolute fashion, and still are relatively opposed to Chadli Bendjedid's regime, with their insistence on the need for a proliferation of parties and the imposition of a limit on the Algerian Liberation Front Party's monopoly of organized political activity?

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It is clear that President Chadli Bendjedid and the current political leadership in Algeria have declared that they will not permit a multiplicity of parties, that the Algerian Liberation Front Party is the sole political vehicle for various forces although its door is open to everyone who wants to engage in organized political activity, without discrimination and that there is no room for another political organization outside the Front Party but there can only be independent individual politicians be they supporters or opponents.

A New Current within the Agreement

The question is, will Chadli Benjedid allow Ben Bella, as an exception, to form an independent political organization outside the Liberation Front Party or will he at least avert his gaze from his actual presence without officially approving of him?

Well informed sources in Algeria emphasize that even if there was a tendency on President Chadli's part at the beginning actually to improve of Ben Bella's independent organization, that is impossible today, especially with the appearance of early signs of solidarity between the politico-religious trends arising in Algeria and the group of ideas which Ben Bella has started to express on the verge of starting his new political life.

Nonetheless, a number of observers tend to declare that there is a likelihood of indirect talks between President Chadli and former President Ben Bella through intermediaries. After that, it is possible that Ben Bella will head an independent political current in the Liberation Front Party which will have the right of expression and action and whose members who have not joined the Liberation Front Party will be given party membership as soon as they apply for it, without going through red tape.

It appears that this is the most likely possibility, although the matter will of necessity need time to emerge in a reasonable form which does not clash with the "hardline Boumediene forces" and is compatible with the steps toward political liberation which President Chadli Bendjedid leads.

Mr Taieb Ibrahimi, the minister counselor at the presidency who is known as the architect of the new liberalization policy in Algeria and was one of the most intense opponents of Ben Bella, who imprisoned him for many years, has been quoted as saying "When Ben Bella was in power, he closed all the doors in our faces and put our hands in chains. Today, however, now that we are in power, we are opening the doors to him and all the Algerians and are undoing all the chains on him and them."

Thus all observers look with interest at Ben Bella's future in his second political life, as he keeps wary silence and contents himself with transitory signals which imply numerous possibilities.

However, the essential truth in all this is that Ben Bella is a "political fish" who lives only in the turbulent sea of politics. Therefore, the "legendary Ben Bella" is returning again to political life after an absence of 15 years in order to begin

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a new struggle, as he nears age 63 and has become the head of a family which he formed in his prison through his wife Zahra and two adopted girls, the older of whom is 11 and is called Mahdia.

What possibilities do you suppose Abu Mahdia is headed for in his new life?

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ALGERIA

COUNTRY'S 1980-1984 FIVE-YEAR PLAN EXAMINED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 pp 3331-3332

[Article: "The 1980-1984 Algerian Plan Aims Primarily to Restore Basic Balances: 400 Billion in Investments; 1 Million Jobs"]

[Text] Algeria this year undertook a 5-year plan (1980-1984) with an overall financial budget of 400 billion dinars (1 dinar = about 1.24 f). In doing this, it emerges from a long period of economic pause and of political reflection on the future of its development, followed by a year of debates at the highest level on the new economic strategy of the country, taking into account the results of a 10-year period of efforts in all sectors of the economic and social life (see MTM, 3 October, p 2407).

In fact, the first Algerian 5-year plan, elaborated in 1979, had been approved at the beginning of the same year at a special general meeting of the FLN, the highest political instance of the country. On the basis of the economic orientations of this program, the government last year had proposed to the National People's Assembly a budget plan that constituted the first annual portion of the 5-year plan, which was consequently begun at the beginning of 1980. This document was adopted by the national assembly on 19 November, after a 1-month debate.

Thus it took more than a year of discussion, study, and public debate for the highest political instance and the legislative instance to approve the 5-year plan, since the most recent 4-year plan (1974-1977) had been concluded in principle in 1978. The death of President Houari Boumediene at the end of this same year and matters concerning his succession relegated the economic problems of the country to second place. Chadli Bendjedid, who succeeded the former chief of state in February 1979, preferred to gather all of the data on the economy of the country and directed the economic officials to draw up a detailed and accurate balance sheet of the preceding 10-year period, in order to gauge the distance covered and to indicate as clearly as possible the country's 10-year prospects.

Benefits and Gaps In a Rapid Development

This balance sheet and this national reflection show that the economic strategy applied during this past 10-year period produced some noteworthy results: the setting up of a basic industry, based on the exploitation of the national wealth entirely recovered from the hands of foreign companies; the building of a

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production apparatus that guarantees the development of the country and its economic independence; responsibility for full control of the economy by the country, etc.

While paying tribute to the work of President Boumediene, the new leadership team did not fail to call attention to the gaps engendered by the rapid development of the economy: huge investments effected over a period of 10 years in the industrial sector (55 percent of overall investments) resulted in imbalances to the extent that other sectors now considered as priority in comparison were relegated to second place. The example of agriculture and hydraulics which, along with fishing, were accorded only 9 percent of these investments, is the most striking. What is more, the present leaders realize that this industrial investment effort did not achieve the hoped for results by far. Not only that, it had ended by losing all effectiveness and any coherence, but it had also aggravated "inter-sectorial and intra-sectorial, inter-regional and intra-regional distortions." In short, the production apparatus that was set up is used only to 30 percent or 40 percent of capacity, whereas the ever-increasing needs of consumer and industrial goods oblige the country to resort to a huge amount of importations. In short, Algeria, whose major objective was to render its economy less dependent on foreign countries, realizes that its economic independence is more threatened than ever by the considerable increase in importations of all kinds of consumer goods that the industrialization process that was undertaken 10 years ago should have reduced.

In fact, this propensity to import went from 23 percent in 1967 to more than 48 percent in 1978, which greatly affected the equilibrium of the trade balance of Algeria, whose recourse to foreign countries resulted in increased foreign indebtedness and limited the hoped for results of expansion and acceleration within its economy.

Overall, on the level of production, the PIB (gross domestic product) evolution from 1967 to 1978 is far from satisfactory. While the objectives were 9 percent annually for the first 4-year plan (1970-1973) and 11.2 percent for the second 4-year plan (1974-1977), actual realizations were only 5.9 percent and 5.5 percent respectively. On a per capita basis, the PIB (gross domestic production) experienced only some slight rates of increase, between 2 percent and 3 percent a year. The low amount of productivity occasioned a significant increase in the accumulation of goods and services (more than 50 percent of the PIB). And this low amount, illustrated by a more rapid increase in value added with respect to the services sectors than with that of the production sectors of material goods has, as has been seen, greatly benefited foreign economies.

On the financial level, the amount of revenue increased considerably as a consequence of the great amount of investments; it increased at the rate of 8 percent during the 1967-1969 period; 11 percent during the first 4-year plan, 1970-1973; and 17 percent during the second 4-year period, 1974-1977. Moreover, this revenue, which did not evolve in an identical manner in different social categories, was affected by an ever-increasing inflation at an average rate of 10 percent in the 1967-1978 period.

Still with respect to the financial aspect, the inadequacy of the distribution of monetary income, along with the production effort and a weakness in the PIB sector,

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engendered some chronic shortages of goods, price increases that considerably affect the purchasing power of low income and fixed income categories, and the great recourse to importations of goods and services. The rate of rapid increase in the amount of money (23 percent per year) compared with that of the PIB (7.2 percent) has increased inflationary tensions. Thus, the loans of the Central Bank of Algeria to the treasury, which depended on circumstances up to the eve of the first 4-year plan, became almost systematic since then and aggravated distortions in the operation of the economy and increased inflationary tensions, which in turn caused social tensions.

On the social plane, however, there have been considerable efforts to improve the standard of living of the population. The employment situation, for example, has changed remarkably during this period in that 1 million nonagricultural jobs have been created. The school attendance rate has reached the respectable figure of 73 percent, even though a disparity persists in this regard between the rural sector (53 percent) and the urban sector (88.5 percent) and between the school attendance of girls (59.6 percent) and that of boys (80.8 percent).

All the same, the reverse of the good level of employment and of the school attendance attained is still disquieting. There is a relative decrease in qualitative education, with a training policy that is not always consonant with the real needs of the economy, incoherence between the teaching sector and that of the occupational training sector, illustrated by the existence of a floating population of a million young people, 15 to 20 years old, unemployed because they are excluded from the educational system, for which these young people are too old, and from the employment market, because they are too young.

In the health sector, the significant efforts that have been undertaken are manifestly inadequate. Of course, free medicine has been an outstanding measure and some real progress has been noted in the increase of medical centers and the number of doctors. But, the mediocrity of the medical apparatus, the inadequacy of preventive medicine, and the shortage of resources in the face of the enormous needs of a population that is more and more numerous and demanding are known.

Finally, in Algeria the housing crisis has reached disquieting proportions, which the government, in spite of the financial means and materials that it expects to allocate to it during the next 10 years, will have a great deal of difficulty in alleviating, since the deficit in the housing sector is estimated at more than a million dwellings.

The Priority Of Improvement In Living Conditions

In general, and while awaiting the publication of the details of the 5-year plan after its adoption by the national assembly, improvement in the living conditions of the people constitutes the priority objective of the economic and social policy of the government during the future 5-year period (1980-1984).

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For 1981, an annual plan, with a total of 83.8 billion dinars, was adopted this past 16 November by the government and will be submitted to the national assembly. Among other things, this annual plan provides for the creation of 200,000 jobs during the next year, which is consonant with the provisions of the 5-year plan, which aims to create 1 million jobs.

The average rate of growth of the Algerian economy during the 5 years of the plan would be at least 8 percent a year; that of industry, 12 to 13 percent; that of agriculture, 4 percent. The rate of increase in importations for its part will be limited to 6 percent a year, compared with 20 percent during the past 4 years, while some draconian measures are envisaged with a view to limiting foreign technical assistance and to alleviating the burden of the balance of payments, which includes service for the debt evaluated at 22 percent of exportations (25 billion dinars).

Without renouncing the economic plan of President Boumediene's strategy for the industrialization of the country, the new team in power intends to center the major portion of its efforts on the restoration of the basic balances of the economy during the first 5-year period of this decade, before resuming, in a second stage and at a more sustained rate, the industrialization process which, one says in Algiers, meanwhile will not be called in question at all.

Moreover, the industrial sector, although in slight regression in the 5-year plan in comparison with the preceding 4-year plans, remains predominant, with a credit of 154.5 billion dinars. However, it is to be noted that the major part of these industrial investments, that is, more than 90 billion dinars, will serve to finance some overdue projects from the last plan. Moreover, more than 40 percent of industrial investments, that is, 63 billion dinars, will be allotted to hydrocarbons, which furthermore have always had the lion's share of these investments, but which this time had to yield ground to the advantage of other industrial sectors, for which hydrocarbons remain "the financial backers" (96 percent of foreign currency receipts).

Three sectors--agriculture, hydraulics, and housing--which in the two preceding plans were the "poor relatives" of the investment policy, this time benefit from clearly more important credits and in addition are considered by the government as priority sectors. Agriculture and hydraulics would thus be allotted credits amounting to 47 billion dinars. As a consequence of the serious housing crisis that has been rampant for several years in the country, more than 60 billion dinars have been allocated to housing. It is envisaged that 2 million dwellings will be built during the next 10 years.

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ALGERIA

STATUS OF GAS PRICE NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRENCH COMPANY REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3330

[Text] For want of an agreement in Algiers, Gaz de France will have to continue gas price negotiations.

As was again emphasized very recently in a press conference by Mohamed Shanoun, Algerian ambassador to Paris, if Algeria indeed intends to sell its gas at a price that is in line with that of crude oil, it nevertheless does not exclude that this alignment will be realized progressively. Negotiations are being carried out along these lines not only with Gaz de France, but also with the other partners that are concerned--the United States, Belgium, Spain, West Germany, and Italy (MTM, 28 November, p 3132).

After the failure of the 5 and 6 November Paris meeting (MTM, 14 November, p 3019), a new phase of the negotiation took place, apparently without any more success, however, in Algiers, where a Gaz de France delegation sojourned on 30 November and 1 December. It appears that if the French side is in agreement on the principle of price indexing LNG [liquefied natural gas] and oil, which is what the Algerians said after the meeting in Algiers at the end of October of Andre Giraud, French minister of industry, and Belkacem Nabi, Algerian minister of energy and petrochemical industries (MTM of 7 November, p 2955), the negotiation is stumbling on the definition of the upset price of a new contract and above all on the indexing formula.

Under the terms of the old contract, Gaz de France, which pays an advance of \$3.20 per million BTU (British Thermal Unit) for the GNL received from Sonatrach, should pay \$3.60 beginning with this coming 1 January. This price is now considered insufficient by the Algerians, who envisage an upset price that is greater than \$4.00 and that will progressively go to about \$6.00 per million BTU.

In informed circles in Algiers, one lets it be understood that another round of negotiations between Sonatrach and Gaz de France will not take place before the beginning of next year, especially because of Belkacem Nabi's full calendar. In fact, on 15 December Nabi is to participate as chairman at the next ministerial session of OPEC in Bali (Indonesia); and on 25 December, in the work of the central committee of the FLN, the single Algerian party, for the purpose of examining energy matters in Algeria.

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IRAQ

SWEDEN'S VOLVO CAUGHT BETWEEN IRAN, IRAQ IN TRUCK DEALS

Stockholm WECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 18 Dec 80 p 7

[Text] Even before Christmas the first of a total of 2,140 Volvo trucks will begin to roll from Sweden to Iraq. Volvo brought home the order, amounting to 730 million kronor, back in the summer, but until now the war between Iraq and Iran has prevented deliveries.

For Volvo, with manufacture of motors for irrigation pumps, etc., in Iran, the deliveries may become a politically sensitive question. The concern is also involved in a legal fight with Iran concerning compensation for the nationalized truck factory in that country.

However, more and more political observers are saying that the conflict, which now has the character of a stalled war of position, may perhaps be on the way to a peaceful solution. An Iraqi indication of the desire to "normalize everyday life" was the industry fair in Bagdad that opened this year--a month late--on 15 November. "The only signs that the country is in the midst of a war were the daily air-raid alarms and the fact that the public had no access to the fair," says Hans G. Engzell at the Export Council. "No formal opening took place, either, and the participants were not allowed to indicate the country of origin with flags or other national symbols."

For Swedish firms the "normalization" means that, for example, the Skånska Cementgjuteri's conference hotel construction is now getting under way again.

Some 250 previously evacuated Swedish construction workers--as the first international entrepreneurs--are back on the job in Bagdad. "The work on the hotel building is continuing at a rate that is diminished only by temporarily reduced electric power and the night blackouts, which interfere with shift work," says Knut Jönsson, SCG [Skanska Cementgjuteriet; Scanian Cement Casting]. The building is worth 700 million kronor today to SCG, which has also taken up discussions of compensation for damages with the Iraqi authorities. "But," says Knut Jönsson, "as long as the war is going on no figures can be settled on. For the same reason we do not know how much it will be delayed."

In addition to the reconstruction that will be necessary after the end of the war, Iraq is planning ten or so extensive construction projects, including harbor

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construction at Basra. Dredging the Tigris also enters into the plans. "SCG will be competing for several of these projects," says Knut Jönsson.

After the United States and Saudi Arabia, Iraq is Sweden's biggest non-European trading partner. Exports to Iraq increased by 126 percent last year to 1.4 billion kronor and were on the way to a further increase this year when the war broke out. Imports from Iraq, chiefly oil, rose during the first half of this year to 680 million kronor and according to the oil agreement signed in 1979 are to increase gradually to 2 billion kronor a year.

The larger Swedish businesses in Iraq (19 are represented in all), in addition to SCG and Volvo, include Saab-Scania, the country's chief supplier of trucks, with an assembly plant in Iraq and sales last year of 4,000 vehicles.

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ISRAEL

ISRAELI, SYRIAN SHIPS SUSPECTED OF CARRYING U.S. ARMS TO IRAN

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 pp 16, 17

/Article: "A Secret Revealed by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: Two Ships, Israeli and Syrian, Transport Massive Arms and Spare Parts Cargo from a Belgian Port"/

/Text/ International shipping circles have observed two ships, one Israeli and the other Syrian, which came together at dock in the well known port of Antwerp in Belgium on behalf of a group of arms merchants 2 weeks ago.

This group of arms merchants proceeded to load the two ships with large quantities of American arms and spare parts, especially ones related to Phantom jets, BB missiles, and Israeli Gabriel torpedoes.

These circles confirmed that the Israeli vessel, on its journey from the port of Haifa to the port of Antwerp, transported some arms manufactured in Israel and completed its load with some other American arms and spare parts from the European market.

The Syrian vessel loaded up with arms and spare parts manufactured in America which a group of arms merchants had recently imported from the United States.

International shipping circles tracked the movement of the two ships from the time they left the port of Antwerp in Belgium on the night of 17 November.

It was learned that the Syrian ship headed for the port of Tripoli, Libya, where it unloaded its cargo in the presence of a joint Libyan-Iranian team.

The Israeli ship set sail for South Africa and unloaded its cargo, which was reloaded onto a Portuguese vessel to the account of a commercial arms office in Lisbon. In the Portuguese capital the entire cargo was delivered to an Iranian military delegation.

Observers' estimates on the value of the cargoes of the two ships ranged from \$100 to \$125 million.

The conclusion of these maritime arms transactions through Brussels, Tripoli, Damascus and Lisbon was accompanied by a process of political flirtation which has started waxing again between Washington and Tehran, reaching its zenith

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with Carter's declaration that his country had tilted toward Iran in its armed struggle with Iraq.

A number of Western diplomats are inclined to believe that Tehran asked the United States for a specific action which would give strong indications of its commitment to its declared stands. While he was in New York Raja'i, the prime minister of Iran specified through Chinese intermediaries that the requisite American action would consist of two things:

First, urgently providing Iran with quantities of American spare parts and arms, especially Phantom airplanes and Israeli torpedoes, which the Israeli navy uses, through Washington, as an earnest.

Second, putting pressure on a number of Western European countries which are committed to contracts to supply Iraq with arms to stop executing these contracts.

When in the course of discussions the problem of transporting the "arms-earnest" from non-American locations to Iran by American, non-European means arose, thinking at the outset favored Chinese ports as a site and Chinese ships as a means. However, the American National Security Agency protested against this thinking, offering two arguments:

First, using China as a location for the export of American and Israeli arms would come up against political obstacles which would take great effort to reduce. In addition, the length of the route would mean losing precious time for the United States and the Iranian regime both. Second, the use of China for this operation would mean provoking the Soviet Union, which would certainly respond with force in the same region or another one. That is something that would confuse America's calculations, especially in the circumstances of the presidential elections.

In the face of this objection, Iran offered the solution of using Libya as an export site and ships bearing the Syrian flag as means of transportation.

However, the difficulty of carrying this out in the case of the Israeli weapons required by the Iranian navy became obvious. After discussion, it was possible to arrive at an agreement by adopting Belgium as the point of departure for the export voyage, since the requisite arms would be loaded in the Belgium port on one Syrian ship which would go to Tripoli and from there to Iran and on one Israeli ship which would go to South Africa and thence to Portugal then Iran.

At the same time, a campaign erupted in America, Western Europe, especially France, and Israel against the continued execution of the European arms contracts with Iraq, which had been concluded before the war broke out. The press campaign was concentrated against the French government.

When the news that Iran was being supplied with American and Israeli arms leaked out, both Washington and Tel Aviv hastened to deny the news. However, as the news spread and the approach of the various groups was exposed, Walter Mondale, the American vice president, was compelled, in an American television interview he held at the end of last week, to say that he was in a situation where "he could not confirm this news or deny it."

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However, the matter did not stop with America and Israel providing an "arms earnest" to the Iranian regime. Iran decided to form a tripartite alliance with Syria and Libya through which, after the earnest was paid, the transaction would be carried out in a more comprehensive fashion, also including the improvement of American relations with both Libya and Syria and an attempt to create a settlement with Israel along the lines of the Camp David settlement, but in the context of what is called an "Islamic solution," provided that Egypt not participate in it, at least not at the beginning, lest severe doubts and complications be stirred up in Iran, Syria and Libya.

Politicians and analysts are observing the course of events carefully, now that both America and Israel have paid the "arms-earnest" to Iran, Libya and Syria, and they are waiting for the implementation of the new tripartite transaction and the reactions of the Egyptian regime, which has temporarily kept away from it.

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ISRAEL

ARABIC JOURNAL VIEWS ABU HATZERA SCANDAL

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 p 35

/Article: "A Series of Israeli Scandals--from the Ministry of Religious Affairs to the Interior Ministry: Abu Hatzera Plots His Revenge"/

/Text/ Before Yosef Burg, the Israeli minister of the interior and chairman of the ministerial committee on the autonomy negotiations, set out to the United States recently to resume the autonomy negotiations, he commented that the accusations which had been made against his ministry, revolving about embezzlement in the special budget of the ministry, were empty ones, and added that the reason the issue was raised at the present time was very obvious and could be attributed to the coming round of Israeli elections.

The Ministry of the Interior scandal is focussed on speculation with private funds and bequests which the Ministry of the Interior transfers each year to various religious institutes through the municipalities and their local councils. After some police personnel had investigated the matter, it appeared that some of these institutes do not exist at all but are imaginary. Another portion of funds was transferred to political bodies and ordinary people connected to the Mifdal religious party which is headed by Yosef Burg, in order to prepare for the coming elections.

The start of publication of news about this case coincided with the approaching conclusion of the investigation into the Ministry of Religious Affairs scandal, to which the Israeli press has devoted prominent space on its pages in the past few months. Aharon Abu Hatzera, minister of religious affairs, was accused of distributing payoffs to a number of his relatives and senior officials in the ministry as well as embezzling funds allocated to the Israeli religious schools or Yeshivot.

Following the investigation the Israeli police made after invading the building of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and appropriating a quantity of documents and evidence on directions from Yosef Burg, it appeared that most of the names of the religious schools were imaginary, and the same was true regarding the names of students. Developments in the investigation in the recent period led to the interrogation of the minister of religious affairs himself.

One of the most important outcomes of the case of the minister of religious affairs was the shedding of light on the "racism" which the artificial structure of Israeli society is suffering from. People in the oriental groups, the Sephardim, rebelled

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in the face of the charges directed against the minister of religious affairs, Abu Hatzera, since he is of Moroccan origin. They accused Yosef Burg and police officials of weaving an "Ashkenazi plot" against him.

Abu Hatzera's Negotiations

It is worth mentioning that the ministers Yosef Burg and Aharon Abu Hatzera belong to the Mifdal religious Party, which is made up of three main blocs, most important of which is the (Liyemefna) Bloc led by Yosef Burg, the party chief, followed by the Likud and Torah Block headed by Aharon Abu Hatzera and the List of the Young headed by Zevulun Hammer, minister of culture.

Recently negotiations took place between the two ministers Abu Hatzera and Zevulun Hammer to consolidate activities and seize the party leadership from Yosef Burg. That was one of the most important reasons for Burg's fear and his consequent firm stand behind the investigation into the Ministry of Religious Affairs case--to damage Abu Hatzera's reputation and assure himself of the party leadership.

In affirmation of this goal, he encouraged the expansion of this investigation in order to compel Abu Hatzera to resign and have Gad Navon, the chief rabbi of the Israeli army, appointed in his place.

Thus it is not to be ruled out that Abu Hatzera is behind the revelations on the latest Ministry of Interior scandal, because of his knowledge of what was going on within the wings of the Mifdal party. Therefore, the similarity of the accusations directed against the two ministries does not inspire amazement; the issue of the exploitation of funds by various ministries, specifically Interior, for electoral interests is not new to the ruling circle in Israel.

From the first days Yosef Burg stood behind the investigation on the case of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Abu Hatzera demanded that his supporters gather information on Yosef Burg, and they actually managed to obtain documents from some local councils which constituted a "pipeline" for Ministry of the Interior funds to special party committees.

The Ministry of Agriculture on the Way

In another sense, the embezzlement cases in the Ministries of Religious Affairs and the Interior are not new, but had been bruited about for a long time. The newspaper HA'OLAM HAZEH published an investigation 2 years ago into speculation with funds allotted to the Jewish religious schools, the Yeshivot, and the state supervisor presented a similar report on the conduct of the Ministry of the Interior.

Thus exposing these cases at the present time and directing all the exposures against the Mifdal Party cannot be isolated from the internal game of leadership among party members on the one hand and the issue of the Israeli elections on the other, since the incorporation of the Mifdal Party into the Likud bloc constitutes one of the main means for obtaining a majority in the Knesset.

Therefore the Likud leaders did not look with satisfaction upon the negotiations which went on recently between the leaders of the Mifdal party and the Maarakh

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opposition bloc to establish an alliance after the coming elections ended and a new government was to be formed. Yosef Burg met repeatedly with Shimon Peres to study this matter.

In addition, the Mifdal leaders, in particular Yosef Burg, support the notion of holding the Israeli elections earlier than their specified date November of next year, and others have reservations on the approval of a special plan to impose Israeli law on the Golan Heights and incorporate them into Israel.

It is probable that some members of the financial /sic/ government will play a part in shattering the unity of the Mifdal party in calculating the circumstances bearing on the Israel elections.

Thus these cases show the degree of the blatant corruption in the agencies of the Israeli regime, which recently afflicted the Israeli military establishment itself, resulting in the fall of the Maarakh government in the last elections.

The question which raises itself now is, Will the police break into the office of the minister of the interior to put its hand on the ministry's documents, as happened in the case of the Ministry of Religious Affairs?

In this case, the police will be taking a careful stand, since they are directly subordinate to the authority of the minister of the interior himself.

A senior official in the ministry, following the publication of news about these charges, commented by saying "The snowball has started rolling and it is difficult to stop it."

He went on to say that it was possible to lighten the load on the Ministry of the Interior by revealing similar cases in other ministeries. He hinted at the Ministry of Agriculture, which has been assumed by Arik Sharon!

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ISRAEL

CURRENT STATUS OF PEACE NOW ANALYZED

Tel Aviv NEW OUTLOOK in English Nov/Dec 80 pp 25-29

[Article by Hillel Schenker]

[Text]

Marsha Pomerantz published an article covering 5 columns on the back page of the "Jerusalem Post" two days after Peace Now's recent ideological rally at "Binyanei Ha'uma" in Jerusalem. Among other things, she wrote: "Peace Now represents a brand of humanism, but there are no very specific instructions around for being human, or humane, in Israel 1980. . ." She added that people from across the country came "wondering what is to be done, and left without an answer after 3 hours of speeches". In the end, she wrote, "No one told the assemblage of professors and soldiers, teenagers and grandmothers what is to be done. We'll have to figure it out together. The general direction was clear. The people were there. That's something. . ."

This may not be the most penetrating or sophisticated analysis of the situation, but it does describe how many people feel today.

Yes, the people were there. 3,000 came to fill up the huge "Binyanei Ha'uma" auditorium. This was quite an achievement, considering the fact that the meeting, unlike other demonstrations, was not called in response to any specific event or crisis. Rather, it was a culmination of a series of ideological seminars that Peace Now has held in Jerusalem during the past few months.

In the lobby outside the auditorium there was a display of Peace Now T-shirts, stickers, pop-political art against occupation and for peace, as well as postcards to be signed and sent to Shimon Peres, demanding that he and the Labor Party unequivocally oppose the proposed bill to annex the Golan Heights. One sign contained a quotation from David Ben-Gurion: "Our desire for peace between the Jewish people and the Arab people is one of the organic cornerstones of Zionism. Without that aspiration, everything is distorted." Another poster contained countless photographs, Andy Warhol-style, of the "Gush Emunim" settlement at Elon Moreh. Pasted on top of the pictures, in chronological order, were newspaper headlines reflecting the "progress" of the Israeli-Arab conflict: 12/6/67 "Eban: The Time Has Arrived For Direct Contacts Between Israel And The Arab States." 13/6/67 "Dayan: We Are Waiting For A Telephone Call From The Arabs." 8/10/73 "Difficult And Bitter Fighting Towards Victory." 18/11/77 "Welcome President Sadat" (in Hebrew, Arabic, and English).

There were piles of a pamphlet on Peace Now's approach to Zionism, containing quotes from Amos Oz, Amnon Rubinstein, A.B. Yehoshua, Ya'acov Talmon, Albert Memmi, David Ben-Gurion, Y.H. Brenner, "The Tear-Gas Monologue" (which appeared in "New Outlook" - H.S.), Meir Wizeltier, Natan Alterman, Yehudah Amihai, Martin Buber, and a Peace Now statement on Zionism.

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Another pamphlet contained proposals presented by 6 workshops that were held at the ideological seminars. The statement on Zionism and the 6 workshop-reports are important, and definitely should be studied and circulated. But statements and reports are static, intellectual, passive, though undoubtedly political expressions. Until now, Peace Now's strength has been in its action, its extra-parliamentary activity in the streets.

Which brings me back to the live part of the evening.

The biographies of the four guest speakers were an effective symbolic expression of the moral and political weight that Peace Now carries in Israeli society. General (Res.) Avraham Adan ("Bren") has a long and brilliant military record, and he was "the other general" who crossed the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur War. Prof. (General Res.) Yehoshaphat Harkabi was the Chief of Military Intelligence, and one of Israel's main ideologues in its approach to the Arab world. A.B. Yehoshua is one of Israel's leading younger writers, whose book "The Lover" is, among other things, a sensitive portrayal of the plight of an Israeli Arab. Writer and educator, S. Yizhar, who was once the Number Two man in *Raffi's* Knesset list, following David Ben-Gurion, wrote stories in 1948 (such as *Hirbet Hiz'ah*) which are still moral touchstones for the Israeli society. (Prof. Harkabi and A.B. Yehoshua participated in "New Outlook's" Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue in September 1978, and S. Yizhar in the Washington Symposium in October 1979.)

Gen. (Res.) Adan said that the Government likes to talk about how great a strategic asset Israel is to the West, but actually, it is insignificant compared to the large geopolitical strategic assets that the Arabs have to offer. Additional points included the fact that our lack of consideration for the Palestinians does not serve our interests, and that a partial peace will not last. Since we are still faced with threats on the Eastern Front, General Adan supports the principle of aspiring to defensible borders, but adds that unreasonable demands on the part of Israel end by hurting the reasonable needs.

Prof. Harkabi admitted that he did not know what to recommend to Peace Now on the programmatic or tactical level. His main point was to call upon Peace Now to serve as a catalyst for a profound national soul-searching about the Jewish-Arab conflict. He said that until 1967 the Zionist movement was guided by a realistic perspective, but the post-67 period introduced an increasingly unrealistic view, with greater stress on myth and legend. The climax of this trend towards unreality was the rise of the *Likud* to power. Prof. Harkabi said that we must take moderate positions, not because the Arab world has changed, but because moderate positions are the only feasible ones. We must also take into account the world's attitudes.

S. Yizhar stressed his feeling that there is a lack of symmetry between the Israeli peace forces and the Palestinian activity (or lack of it) for peace and compromise. He wished to hear more assertive Palestinian voices calling for peace, comparable to Peace Now's voice. Although 80% of his remarks were devoted to this lack of symmetry, he added at the end that we should be ready to take every opportunity to talk with Palestinians who are ready to talk with us. He also said that even if there is a lack of symmetry, we have to continue to act unilaterally for peace as if there was symmetry.

A.B. Yehoshua said that Peace Now made a decisive contribution to the first stage of the peace process, to Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. He believes that there is no reason to be pessimistic now. He noted that a Peace Now spokesman had talked pessimistically on T.V. about the struggle against the settlements in the West Bank. He reminded the audience that Lova Eliav had been the only one to raise his hand in the Labor Central Committee in 1972 against the establishment of Yamit and the Pafah settlements, and now they are being evacuated.

Yehoshua compared the current situation to the Act Four of a classical drama: the lull, the intermediate period before the conclusion of the action.

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Yehoshua concluded by saying that the "Palestinian problem" is very much our own problem. He said that if things will be good for the Palestinians, they will be good for us. He also said that we have to have greater faith in what they say. When the Arabs said they wanted to throw us into the sea, we believed them. "Now, when an Arab says that he wants to compromise, to live alongside us, I believe him."

Yohi Amir of *Oz V'Shalom* spoke eloquently about the religious principle "Ye shall seek peace and pursue it," rejecting *Gush Emunim's* claim to be the sole trustee of the religious legacy. He reminded the audience of Abraham's appeal to his nephew Lot to divide the land if they could not agree to live on it together.

Gari Brenner of Kibbutz Hatzor spoke passionately about the importance of Peace Now among youth who have grown up with 13 years of occupation as the only reality they know, and among Diaspora Jewry. A. Vilan, of Kibbutz Negba, spoke about the need to de-emphasize street demonstrations in an election year. He said that Peace Now should be ready to take to the streets again after the next government takes over, to counteract any obstructionist tendencies to the completion of the peace process from extremist fringe elements.

Naftali Raz said that the movement should place greater stress on educational activities, and that Peace Now should be known as a political-educational movement. He also informed the audience that Israeli television had refused to cover the gathering.

It was good to hear the guest speakers, and the spokesmen. But, as Marsha Pomerantz wrote, after three hours of speeches, the audience did not feel it had the answer to the question "What is to be done?"

The truth is that it is not easy to formulate guidelines for action today. How Peace Now should act in the current circumstances did not become clear at the rally, and activists are ready to admit the dilemma, which must be solved soon to enable the movement to have the maximum impact in the near future.

Peace Now is facing phase two. Phase one was the period between February 1978, when it evolved in response to the delaying tactics of the Begin government against Sadat's initiative. This phase reached its successful climax with the signing of the Camp David agreements (following the movement's 100,000-strong demonstration, that Begin admitted had haunted him at Camp David) in September 1978, and finally, with the successful conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979. Peace Now's activity in the streets had served as a counterbalance to obstructionist actions by *Gush Emunim*, and to the hawks in *Herut* and the right wing of Labor. They encouraged Sadat to continue to work towards a political solution.

This is phase two. As General Adan said at the rally, "A partial peace will not last," or as the workshop on Peace Now and the Palestinians concluded, "The Palestinians are at the core of the problem." Peace Now activists know that a comprehensive peace, which includes a resolution of the Palestinian problem, is necessary for the movement to attain its goal of building a sane Zionism.

The question is, what tactics should the movement adopt during this phase of the peace process. There was a very simple symmetry during the first phase: President Sadat, head-of-state of the leading Arab country, was ready to recognize Israel's right to exist, to live alongside it in peace and all Israel had to do was to give back Sinai (of course with appropriate security arrangements), in order to conclude a solid agreement. All the Prime Minister of Israel had to do was to reach out and accept that proffered hand. Peace Now was there to make sure that he didn't hesitate too much, or falter.

It is true, as S. Yizhar said at the rally, that there is no such symmetry between Peace Now in Israel and the peace forces in the Palestinian camp. But how could there be? — Unlike Sadat, no Palestinian spokesman or leader (Arafat or anyone else) can approach an Israeli leader on equal footing, as head of a sovereign government. (Of course Shimon Peres and others say that King Hussein of Jordan could do this — but Hussein insists that he is not a Palestinian, nor is he a spokesman for the Palestinian

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people.) Thus there can be no symmetry between the Israeli peace forces and the Palestinian peace forces. As the workshop report concluded: "... one side (the Israeli) will speak with a public voice, which can be loudly expressed because of its open society and political security, and the other side (the Palestinian) will speak more quietly, because of fears of occupation and fanatical forces."

Peace Now is facing three major problems today. The first is how to function during an election year in Israel. As one key activist puts it, "We must make our weight felt in the political process, that is, we must affect the party platforms, and the party representatives." In other words, lobbying to try to implement the 8 principles articulated at the "Interparty Workshop" will become one of Peace Now's major tasks. Examples of this type of activity include the present political forum attended by MK Shulamit Aloni (Citizens Rights Party), MK Haika Grossman (*Mapam*), Dr Meir Pail (*Sheli*), Moshe Kol (Independent Liberals), MK Yossi Sarid (Labor) and MK Mordechai Virshovsky (*Shinui*), meetings with individual MKs, and appearances before platform committees. At the same time, Peace Now must continue its activities in the streets, in order to back up its lobbying power.

The second problem concerns the Palestinian question. Peace Now activists attended the New Outlook Washington Symposium in October 1979, and held discussions with Palestinians in the occupied territories during the past year. This dialogue was broken off in the spring, following the violent murder of Palestinians and Jews, the expulsion of the mayors, and the assassination attempts on the three mayors. The spokesmen of Peace Now expressed the hope that the Palestinians will be ready to resume this dialogue in the near future, and are seeking ways to bring it about. They have also established good relations with the Palestinian press in East Jerusalem.

The third problem concerns the Eastern Jews. Peace Now leaders admits that they have not found the formula to reach these masses. "Money for the poorer neighborhoods instead of for the settlements" is a wonderful slogan, but has not generated a great enthusiasm for Peace Now in those neighborhoods. Is it

because Eastern Jews are unused to grass-roots political action, or are they too preoccupied with day-to-day economic hardships to deal with the "esoteric" question of peace and security? In the words of one Peace Now activist, "The Right talks about security and power in very simple terms - guns and land. Our concept of security is much more sophisticated and complex. It's based on the strength and justice of our society, and on eliminating the external factors that create conflict. This is much harder to explain."

Since Camp David the movement has lost some of its momentum. It has not responded as consistently as it could to the new developments in the peace process, and to the latest obstructionist tactics. This is due partly to the unexpected success of the first stage of the peace process, partly to fatigue, and partly to the complexities of the current phase of the process.

It is good to hold ideological seminars, and to formulate statements and workshops reports, but if the movement wants to maintain its impact, it has to continue to translate its positions into direct action.

The only current issue dealt with at the *Binyanei Ha'uma* conference was the proposed Golan Annexation Bill. No reference was made to the exiled mayors, who are still awaiting the decision of the High Court of Justice, though they are, if one can judge from their statements, the very type of moderate Palestinian leaders that Peace Now is seeking. Nor was there much reference to the repressive activities carried out by the military authorities in the occupied territories. One heard little protest about the huge sums of money being poured into the West Bank (ultimately in vain).

Should Moshe Dayan be the only one to raise questions about the current policy of "preventive" bombings in Lebanon? After the Yom Kippur War, many Israelis, including all of the military correspondents and analysts in the major newspapers, resolved never again to allow military decision-making to be a sacred cow, secure from criticism. This is what Prof. Yehoshaphat Harkabi meant when he called for a national and individual soul-searching.

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Despite all the above, Peace Now supporters are united in the conviction that the movement will continue to function until there is a real breakthrough in resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict. At present there are no serious thoughts about forming a political party (which could possibly kill the movement), and activists say that they will continue to function under an Alignment government, to "keep the leaders of Labor Party honest", and to make sure that the Right does not try to sabotage a potential peace agreement with the Palestinians and the Syrians.

Perhaps the most important, and certainly the most dramatic, statement was made by Mrs Rivka Guber, who lost two sons in the War of 1948: "I know about the cost of war. The cost of war is higher than the cost of peace.

since it is not shared equally. The cost of peace we shall all share. Peace, like love, grows stronger the more it is shared. We must do everything we can to cease being a people that lives on the sacrifice of its sons..."

(See PEACE FRONT on "Peace Now Ideological Workshop.")

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LEBANON

MILITARY SITUATION IN NATION ANALYZED, CONDEMNED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 5-11 Dec 80 pp 24-27

/Article: "The Future of the Legitimate Authorities and the War of the Militias: Who Is Profiting from the Defeat of the Lebanese Army?"

/Text/ The most important event on the Lebanese state is the open war between the army and the militias, in which the legitimate army has not yet recorded any objectives at all. The main beneficiary of this confrontation has been Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, commander of the "Lebanese Forces" (the Christian militia), who is trying to impose a group of small consecutive changes on the ground to constitute a sort of new "fait accompli" in any possible discourse before President Ilyas Sarkis term ends. The main loser, everyone is convinced, is the legitimate power. It has come to be feared that the legitimate power will find itself incapable of recording real security initiatives during the remaining period of the president's feature.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has considered it appropriate to open the file on the army and the militias and try to respond objectively to the question: Who is benefiting from the defeat of the "new Lebanese army? In the context of this answer, a group of questions were directed to Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil in a dialogue whose purpose was to sketch out the framework of dangerous probabilities which recent developments have been preparing for.

What the Lebanese do not dispute today is the fact that it was Henry Kissinger's "genius" that he was able to bring the belligerents in the Middle East together to one table, namely Lebanon, each according to his appetite, to what his hand could grasp and to what his stomach could digest.

What the Lebanese dispute is that the domestic parties which have torn the "Lebanese table" apart since the beginning of the war are today waging a new battle whose goal is to attain the power for which they developed a taste during the fighting and whose gains they have not failed to enjoy. In fact, there are parties which are trying to monopolize power in an indomitable longing for dominance.

Between the authorities' struggle to survive and the authority of struggle which those with designs on power are hinting at, Lebanon, more than at any time, seems like a "country up for sale", the legitimate power in it represents the majority but does not represent itself, the majority is distributed among belligerent

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minorities, and democracy consists of forms which are exercised in a ridiculous, sorrowful way among the barricades along the lines of contact in the heart of the capital.

In the heat of the recent developments, which began with the operation of last 7 July (the battle between the Liberals and the Phalange) and ended with the "Ayn al-Rummanah operation (the expulsion of the army from the Ba'abda Palace area, a big question is being raised: is the Lebanese military establishment capable of existing? By whose power do the Christian militias exercise all this influence in their areas? Where is Lebanon, its form and institutions, headed?

Today AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is trying to answer this question:

The militias are a Lebanese phenomenon which started in the fifties and they express three significant features, at least, from the standpoint of the nature of their growth and emergence:

1. The weakness of the central authorities and their instrument, the national army.
2. The anxiety of political and popular parties over the future and their tendency to depend on themselves rather than relying on the protection of the state.
3. The natural craving for power - indeed for monopolization of power.

It is no secret that the Lebanese regime, its state and institutions, has never at any time, from the time Lebanon gained independence, been a strong one. After the historic bargaining which resulted in Lebanon's independence in 1947, although Syria did not recognize this independence, the era of Shykh Bishara al-Khuri, the first actual independence president, ended in domestic crisis. When President Camille Chamoun took power, the construction of the army had started -- however, that army did not enable the central authorities to control the domestic situation, which erupted in 1958 in bloody events whose declared cause was Lebanon's partiality toward suspect Arab alliances but whose undeclared cause was the struggle for power among the Lebanese themselves. When Gen Fu'ad Shihab assumed the presidency after the "1958 revolution" he tried to establish a sort of developmental and political balance in the administration of the country. However, his era, for its part, ended in something resembling a dilemma. At that time, the Phalange Party had started to taste the gains of power and had started to establish its armed groups. Concerning this stage, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil relates a conversation which took place between him and President Shihab toward the end of his term, saying "The general told me that it has become possible to rely on you in the Phalange. There will be no one besides you on the stage when my term ends. Train the young men well, Pierre!"

The head of the Phalange relates this story to those who are close to him; it stresses what no one argues about, namely that the maronite presidents who followed one another in power since independence realized deep down that the equation on which the Lebanese regime was based, which gives key posts in the Maronites is an obsolete one which cannot survive. Although Fu'ad Shihab tried to establish what was called the "independence state," this attempt failed to achieve its goals,

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and he felt that matters were proceeding in a direction contrary to that of the existing "state." Although a second term was available to him, he chose not to return to the presidency because Lebanon, as he said in his famous message, had become "a country which is not possible to govern."

What Fu'ad Shihab anticipated before his term ended turned out to be correct, because the "era of the Phalange militia" began very early - at the end of the sixties specifically, in the days of President Charles Helou. At that time it was apparent to everyone that the Lebanese army had been adequately mobilized for domestic purposes, that is, to resist the Lebanese group which was trying to "participate" in power, and resist the Palestinians who had been transformed since the 1967 defeat into an armed revolution. The Phalange Party hastened to impose a kind of political guardianship over this army, exploiting the weakness of the central authorities. Everyone remembers the demonstration which the Phalange shamefully called for to support the military organization, which resembled a political group in a domestic struggle.

The first confrontation in the domestic context was when the Lebanese army skirmished with some Palestinian parties in the southern region, then in the area around the sports village in Beirut. With these clashes, the militias started to prepare for a historic role, and whereas they had just been taken bands in camouflage garb, they became groups trained in street fighting with aid from abroad and the interference of a large number of regional and international intelligence agencies.

Laughably Sorrowful Experiments

It is no secret to anyone today that the source of the Phalange's heavy weaponry is Israel; at the beginning light weapons were provided by the Phalange war council through party financial sources and by fighting men themselves between 1973 and 1975, while the most important portion of them came over the Syrian borders at various times in installments. It is also certain that the origins of the weapons of the National Movement militia and the other militias were Arab ones which varied as the alliances of various groups with one Arab regime or another shifted in specific stages.

Foreign intelligence services played a basic role in forming the forces of all the conflicting parties and their military instruments, that is, their militias. Arms and ammunition are two basic elements in wartime, and proof of that in the Lebanese war was the notorious battle of Tall al-Za'tar: the attack of Christian militias on Tall al-Za'tar almost stopped after a short period because ammunition ran out, then went on because Syria at that time hastened to supply its "allies" with the sufficient aid.

The Militias and the Intelligence Services

The militias' experience with the intelligence services was not always happy. In the spring of 1976, the "Zahlah group" (fighting men from Zahlah in the Christian militia) fell into the trap of American intelligence. The inhabitants collected a sum of about 1 million pounds to buy arms and ammunition to fight "the Arab army of Lebanon." They assigned the task to an Armenian merchant of American nationality

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who had previously brought weapons to Lebanon; however, the people of Zahlah, who were waiting for their arms to arrive, did not know that the Armenian merchant was just an American intelligence agent providing arms for a given group whenever the CIA agency decided that it needed the group to protect certain positions or decided to advance along the political and military map with calculated steps carefully studied in advance. After a lengthy wait and promises, it became apparent to the Zahlah group that "Sarkisian" had devoured the funds the inhabitants had collected and that peace had not come and would not come:

What happened to the people of Zahlah also happened to a military organization allied along with the Phalange with American intelligence through one of the latter's agents, disguised as a "humane doctor." This doctor promised the Christian organization light arms whose purchase he would facilitate from South Vietnam and Spain, with the objective of keeping the organization from looking for other sources of armament for a specific time. The "doctor" took his Lebanese clients and traveled around with them for 45 days at sea without letup, searching for the promised ship which would unload its cargo at sea; the tour continued until orders came to return the clients to the coast at Juniyah without their buying a single round.

The Phalange itself had an experience with its Syrian allies in the battle of 'Aliyah in the fall of 1976. At that time, the Phalange-Syrian alliance was in a honeymoon, but the Phalangists had not learnt what the limits of their "provisions" from Syria were and had not understood that they were in alliance with Damascus and that Damascus was not in alliance with them and that they were in its service, not the other way around. In the battle of 'Aliyat, the Phalangists tried, as Isreal tried in the October 1978 fighting, to transcend the advice of "allies" and invade the town; there was a real massacre in one day of the fighting when Syrian joint forces artillery fired on the advance procession of the Phalange in the Tal'at al-Kahhalah (the eastern suburb of Beirut).

Undeclared Coordination

The experience of the late Kamal Jumblatt and the National Movement with Damascus was no different from that of the Phalange. This is because two wills were and still are tugging back and forth in the Lebanese war: the first is the will of Syria, the second is the will of Isreal. Each has the decisive say in the circles of the group it belongs to. It is Damascus which set off the Lebanese army "war of the barracks," providing the parties to it with support and weapons. Then it allied with the Phalange and participated with it in striking down the national movement and the Palestinian organizations in Beirut, Sufar and Syda: then it advanced and brought the national movement out of the mountains to return and strike at the Phalange in al-Kahhalah, then in the other areas the Christian militia dominate: Is there an undeclared Syrian-Isreali coordination in the Lebanese war?

The Isrealis admit such coordination, although this admission does not constitute proof. Gen Aharon Yariy, head of the Isreali Center of Strategic Studies, in a report published by the Isreali newspaper YEDIOT AHARONOT on 13 October 1980, revealed the following, in these words: "Understanding has been reached on a group of implicit agreements between Isreal and Syria since the latter occupied Lebanon.

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These agreements are founded on the basis that neither party will go beyond specific lines. Experience has proved that both parties have imposed the maximum degree of control over the group they protect. Therefore we consider that the Lebanese experiment in Syrian-Isreali relations underlines the fact that possibilities for dialogue and understanding between the two countries always exist." It is well known that Gen Yariv was commander of Isreali military intelligence for 10 years. While Syria has exercised specific influence on the various armed militias in Lebanon in one form or another, Isreal has trained and armed more than one: the volume of Isreali arms to the Phalange was enough to supply an entire division (11,000 fighting men), with its various land, sea and air corps, with all the arms it required. It is natural that Isreal should retain a number of "friends" in the ranks of persons it has trained and should maintain sound, clear relations with them for specific purposes inside the Phalange organization itself. There are people in the Phalange political bureau who accuse Isreal of using the party's for its interests and who say "If Isreal has wanted us to triumph it would have enabled us to do so on numerous occasions. However, it intervened only to maintain the balance and preserve the situation of no winners and no losers - or, more clearly, to inundate everyone in a war damaging to everyone!"

In any event it is not strange, in accordance with Kissinger's thinking, that Syrian and Isreali strategies should coincide in Lebanon and that the two declared enemies should form an alliance to take possession of Lebanese territory which is easily available, retain the power of the militias, destroy the army and smash its power everytime it manages to emerge. To underline that, there is proof in addition to the clashes which have occurred and are occurring between the Lebanese army and the Syrian deterrent forces on the one hand and between this army and the Christian militias on the other. On 7 February 1978 Syrian army attacked the al-Fayyadiyah barracks of the Lebanese army and Lebanese officers, Christians and Moslems, joined together in the barracks against this attack. Subsequently no actual coordination of any kind occurred on the ground between the legitimate Lebanese army and the Syrian forces which were the patrons of legitimacy, because these forces did not in any event want the resurgence of a Lebanese army which would put an end to its "services" in Lebanon. As long as the army is absent from the Lebanese stage and as long as the militias exist and are ready for combat, the Syrian role will not end and Syria will have adequate justification to remain. Thus, the stronger the militias are and the weaker the state, Syria will be guaranteed the wherewithal for staying in Lebanon and will win a new card in a new game.

It is clear that the real enemy of Isreal is a strong Lebanese state and a strong coherent unified Lebanon, and Isreal's direct or indirect friend is anyone offering it a pretext to intervent, paving the way for it to reach Juniyah and al-Ashrafiyah, and indeed go beyond them. It is as if everything that has been going on in Lebanon for 10 years does not amount to more than an "internal war" which the commanders of Syrian and Isreali intelligence mainly stay up late at night carrying out.

The Ostrich Policy

However, it is also clear that the Lebanese army, with its command, structure and form, has not been prepared, from independence to this day, to survive in the sea

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of struggles the region is witnessing. It is as if this army, in spite of the great hopes the Lebanese attach to it, belongs to a military institution only by virtue of the salaries it troops receive and the provisions the military cooperative offers them. It has happened that the current commander of the army, Gen Victor Khuri, has more than once turned his gaze away from transgressions and conduct infringing directly on the good repute of the command and on the good repute of the organization itself. In this regard, Dean Raymond Iddah, who is in Paris says, "If anyone in the desert commits an aggression against the horse or camel of a bedouin, he perpetrates a major crime by his bare hands. How can the commander of any army be content to have his parents' home blown up and his horses killed without showing the slightest reaction? How can he be content to have one of his officers killed in al-Ashrafiyah or the south, or in an armed ambush of the road, and not take the measures military honor dictates against the killers?"

Perhaps the recent events in 'Ayn al-Rummanah and the charges one could bring against the commanders on their account are further proof of the ineffectiveness of the Lebanese military institution. The commanders were silent about the existence of a military pocket, the al-Hanash pocket of the Liberal Nationalists' Party in the army area, for 3 months, then let another competing pocket, the al-Hanash pocket, the Phalange pocket, grow in exchange. The result was that the army let the two parties fight and played the role of an observer, until one of them managed to expel it from the region!

If they army command failed to impose the state's authority over an area of 5 square kilometers lying in the vicinity of the republican palace command barracks, how could it be hoped to extend the scope of this authority in the future over all Lebanon? How could the Lebanese dream that the authorities could regain the border strip lying under actual Israeli dominance?

The latest disruption in the military organization may be attributed to the structure it was build on; modern experience in the building of armies has proved that that has become inappropriate. However, the military and political commanders are intentionally or unintentionally exercising the policy of the ostrich in this regard, specifically, and on a matter which will not admit of bargaining. In 1977, in accordance with a request by the minister of defense at that time, Fu'ad Butrus, the command formed a five-man committee which was assigned to set out a study related to the future of the army. This committee included officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel and colonel who had taken part in the fighting on both sides, and its recommendations were not accepted by the command. The defense law which Fu'ad Butrus refused to sign (thus resigning from the ministry), divides the army into five armies and the commands. Gen Khuri decided to sign it for American and other "Maronite" considerations related to the post-1982 stage. One should bear in mind that a delegation of Moslem officers went to the office of the commander, who was a minister of defense, and informed him that the interest of Lebanon, Christians and Moslems, required that the law not be passed in the formula in which it had been set out. The commander's answer was "I am confident that the law will not work, but I am also confident that it will not pass the Chamber of Deputies."

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Need for One

After the army's ideology and cause, the army first and foremost requires weapons which enable it to confront its domestic and foreign adversaries. Here it is necessary to establish two facts. First, the former prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss, more than once abstained from signing any contract whatever for the purchase of heavy arms for the army, because he was not convinced of the structural soundness of the military institution. One should bear in mind that the government approved 3 billion pounds for rearmament in 1978. He also refused repairs for the French-manufactured Mirage aircraft, which one should bear in mind was rising 30 percent in cost annually. The second fact is that the Lebanese authorities "put all their eggs" in the United States basket; it happened that Washington donated very modest sums for the purchase of jeeps, rifles, trucks and pistols for officers, while the militias and organizations have four times the heavy weapons that the Lebanese army is armed with.

For example, the militias have Soviet tanks with long-range artillery (122 and 130 millimeter) and missile launchers (Grads and Katyushas). They also possess heavy British tanks (which the Phalange used in the battle of Qanat against the Syrian army) and heavy and light machinery. In every encounter between the army and the militias, the victory goes to the stronger party, above and beyond supremacy in the type and quantity of arms. Then the internal composition of the army is weak. Another matter is that the combat conduct of the army is military conduct, while the militias permit themselves conduct which no military tradition or law whatever would approve, which is related to guerrilla war. While the power of the state is connected directly to the power of the army, any "state" can arise in the midst of the numerous "states" of the militias:

If to all these considerations we add the point that Isreal is standing watching every movement the Lebanese army makes, we can understand the difficulty of this army's tasks. It is no secret that Isreali artillery struck at the army heading south via al-Biq'a' on 1 August 1978 and struck at it again on the coastal road in early summer 1979.

Strategies

It is natural that conflicting strategies should coincide on one issue in Lebanon, in spite of their differences, and that is the rejection of the army. It is the interests of the United States, or the "Kissinger game," that a peace should be set out in the Middle East which will be suitable for Isreal.

Isreal's interest lies in having the Palestinians abandon their identity and their demands in Palestine and assume an alternate country and alternate identity in Lebanon, where the factional atmosphere which the intelligence services created before 1975 encourages the growth of what is by chance called "Palestinian authority" in southern Lebanon.

Returning to the American position, one can wonder: how can Washington arm the Lebanese army while it is trying to apply the Camp David agreements, which state that the Palestinians should be left where they are? Is it reasonable that the United States give the Lebanese army weapons with which it can defend the unity of Lebanon?

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Israeli strategy is not based on the establishment of the Lebanese army; rather, it is antithetical to the Lebanese military institution. Israel's interest lie in keeping the Lebanese state weak so that the Palestinians will seem like a "state" in Lebanon. On the pretext of removing the "Palestinian danger" and "protecting" the Christians of Lebanon, Israel advanced to the lines it reached in 1978 - that is, to the al-Litani River, to establish a new buffer zone on its borders. The Christian militias have benefited from Kissinger's scheme, and, in the absence of the state and the army, from the course of the belligerent parties allied against Lebanon, in order to expand the scope of their dominance over an area which has come to constitute a broad base for the Phalange "statelet." When the chapters of the conspiracy are completed -- if they are destined to be completed -- the Lebanese state, in its current form, will have reached the state of nonexistence.

Will the Lebanese Army survive?

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LEBANON

CHRISTIAN LEADER CALLS FOR NATIONAL UNION, PEACE

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 5-11 Dec 80 pp 27-29

/Article by Florence Ra'd: "Bashir al-Jumayyil Talks to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI: The Arabs Must Not Bring Us To a State of Apostasy"/

/Text/ I met with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese Forces, at the Phalange war council. I met him when I went into the council, and he also arrived at once, by himself, driving his green Mercedes car, approaching with a smile and shortening the procedure for entering his "castle."

Shaykh Pierre's conversation was less violent and more conciliatory to the Lebanese Moslems than his previous ones.

Shaykh Pierre was anxious that the conversation be in writing, giving a lack of time as a reason, but I talked with him a little alongside the written conversation while he was contemplating the cedars engraved on copper which the Phalange Party was preparing to place on the platform to celebrate the 44th anniversary of the Phalange. The written questions I presented to him extended from historic document, the army and taxes to the fifth basin in the port of Beirut and the illegal harbors which said he had closed to Israeli occupation in the south. Shaykh Pierre chose the questions he preferred to answer and left numerous others unanswered. Among the former questions, for instance, was one which asked:

"In your statements you have always put emphasis on the Palestinian and Syrian occupations and have not been content to talk, even indirectly, about the Israeli occupation in the south, an occupation which has taken over sources of water on Lebanese territory and some day will nibble away at Lebanese territory, bit by bit. I am repeating this question because you say that you are extending the hand of dialogue to the Lebanese Moslems: how can they reach out to shake your hand if you do not condemn the Israeli occupation?"

Shaykh Pierre answered by wondering,

"Does that mean that you consider it an occupation?"

When I told him:

"Of course I consider it an occupation."

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He replied,

"I consider that I would have done what Sa'd Haddad has done in the south had I been crammed down there. Now I say, when Sa'd Haddad can send his son or his wife to a medical clinic in Beirut, when the pupils on the border strip can go to the Lebanese University in Beirut, when they 'tear the Palestinians away from our skies,' then we will see!"

Those Who Talk with Us Will Kill Us

When I asked him about who among the Moslems would talk, he replied,

"I cannot venture into these details now, because the Western section is under occupation. When they present the people who will talk with us, they will describe them as they have described others besides them."

I went on to tell him,

"In a previous statement, you offered an invitation to a dialogue. At that time, the al-Murabitun radio replied that they would not reach out to shake the hand of anyone cooperating with Isreal."

Here Shaykh Pierre became excited and said,

"Who asked them to extend their hand or not extend? Five years have gone by, the country is on fire, and we are still playing with words."

When I reviewed the "written conversation," I found that Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil answered one question by saying, "Name me the parties which have been liquidated." I told him:

"In the sixties, the tripartite alliance emerged, consisting of Camille Chamoun, Raymond Iddah and Pierre al-Jumayyil. However, it broke up after the presidential elections. In the Lebanese war the Lebanese Front was formed by Sulayman Franjiyah, Camille Chamoun and Pierre al-Jumayyil, in addition to some small organizations such as the Cedars Guard, the organization and young people of al-Bash Marun, and we heard the Brigade of Offerers, the Brigade of al-Maradah and so forth. Today, we find that the first party which has been liquidated or paralyzed is the National Bloc Party; then a divorce and estrangement has occurred between you and President Franjiyah, the people from Zagharta have withdrawn and liquidations have taken place; then fighting has started between the Phalange and the Liberals in numerous areas."

Shaykh Pierre replied,

"Are you trying to say that all these parties were liquidated? The National Block Party still exists, President Franjiyah's party still exists, and the same with the National Liberal Party."

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50 Gangs Have Become the Lebanese Resistance

I asked him:

"What has happened to pluralism, as a result of the unification of the rifle?"

He answered,

"There use to be 50 million gangs and today we have a single force, the Lebanese resistance."

In the course of talking about the Phalange and the position of Arab officials regarding that he said,

"They are all competing over the Phalange. President Anwar al-Sadat, who at the beginning of the war said 'Take your hands off Lebanon and make an understanding with the Phalange,' today is accusing Pierre al-Jumayyil of trying to establish a Christian state and supporting the Copts of Egypt. President Hafiz al-Asad, who emerged as an exceptional Phalange ally after the 2-years' war, launched a war of extermination against the Phalange 2 years ago and accused it of helping the Moslem Brothers. Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, who has perpetrated the ugliest political and military crimes against the Phalange and the Christians in Lebanon, did not hesitate recently to acknowledge his crimes and call for a dialogue, although he accompanies the appeal for a dialogue with another appeal, to abandon Christianity and embrace Islam. Their situation is wierd. They exchange roles of praise and condemnation, in stages."

Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil refused to express his opinion on the 11th Arab summit conference. He also did not want to elaborate on discussion about the Lebanese army, beyond what he had replied in the written dialogue. He also insisted in denying the rumors bruited about concerning the Phalange's readiness to declare a Maronite state or create alternative conditions to the Lebanese state, saying,

"There is no historic document. For three months they have been talking about such a document, but there is nothing of the kind."

Lebanon -- Where?

After that, the oral conversation moved on to the written one. The first question was on his appraisal of the future of Lebanon 5 years after the Lebanese events. He replied,

"The future of Lebanon is contingent on the form the Lebanese aspire to. If they can negotiate over the best solutions and formats which are in keeping with their societies and give every one of their bodies the freedom and security they aspire to, they will have the Lebanon they want. However, if the Palestinian-Syrian dominance continues to block the will of the Lebanese Moslems, obstruct them and prevent a concord with the Lebanese Christians, this future will be uncertain. However, I am confident that the Lebanese must meet in a wholly free atmosphere to choose the future they want."

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/Question/ Rumors are proliferating about a single-party dictatorship and the unification of the rifle. To what extent are these rumors valid, especially following the successive liquidation of the parties?

/Answer/ First, name me the parties that have been successively liquidated. Second, we know the source of everything that has been said in this regard and its purposes. Everything that President Chamoun has declared, and everything happening on the ground, prove that we are in the vanguard of Lebanese who reject any form of dictatorship whatever. Democracy can be remedied only by more democracy -- that is what we are striving for.

As for the other measures which have been aimed at organizing the ranks of the combatants in the Lebanese resistance, purging them and unifying them, they are necessary and understood. Our proof of that is the psychological and security relaxation in our areas, total support for everything that has happened, and the termination of the crisis following the final agreement which was made in the Lebanese Front on 19 November 1980.

/Question/ The events of 7 July took place under the slogan of an end to smuggling. Have you put an end to these activities? Have your groups been successful in combating gambling? Is there proof?

/Answer/ As I noted in the previous answer, the 7 July movement is going far beyond what is contained in this question. However, as regards smuggling, gambling and the like, you have only to visit our areas and see for yourself what the real state of life there is.

/Question/ What is your opinion about the new cabinet?

/Answer/ Before, during and after the formation of the cabinet, I explicitly stated more than once that we, as a Lebanese resistance, are not concerned with this subject. As for the future, our view of this government, like others like it, before and since, will depend on its positions and its frank actions to liberate the country from the two occupations, the Syrian and the Palestinian ones, and participation in setting out the rules on which the future Lebanese political community will be based.

A Dialogue with Moscow

/Question/ What is the goal in the meetings you held with the Russian ambassador in Beirut? Some people say that you tried to dispel the cold, or at least open an additional line to Moscow.

/Answer/ I have a cause. I am striving to achieve it with all the determination and capability I possess. I am seeking support for it from every horizon which can provide this support. My only condition is that there be no restrictions or conditions whatever infringing on my cause.

In this spirit, far from any interiority complex whatever, I meet with the Russian ambassador, as I meet with others, and I present my cause to the whole world.

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/Question/ What is your appraisal of Arab-Phalange relations?

/Answer/ If the Arab world wants to continue violating the spirit of the Charter of the League of Arab States, and if it continues its very serious ulterior motives which are working to Islamize Lebanon under slogans which are on the surface national and democratic but whose inner spirit are not hidden to us at all, Arab-Phalange relations, and consequently Arab-Lebanese relations, will remain tense and the people bearing the banner of extremism in the Arab world will increase their enmity toward us and Lebanon. We have told the Arab world, and repeated this statement hundreds of times: respect our identity and our independence, respect our distinctive features and our right to freedom and security, and respect our existence -- that will be best for us and for you. However, they are still proceeding with their erroneous conceptions.

Above and beyond that, Lebanon so far has relied on Arab solutions to its crisis. What has the result been? The result has been an increase in the complexity of the crisis and failure to approach a solution. We despair of Arab solutions and the Arabs must not bring us to the state of apostasy.

Who Arms? Who Finances?

/Question/ What are the Lebanese Front's sources of armaments and sources of financing?

/Answer/ They lie in the sweat, blood, activity and firm will of the Lebanese to confront the challenge and overcome it.

/Question/ I met you a full year ago. Could you evaluate the work the Lebanese forces have done domestically and abroad during the year?

/Answer/ Domestically, and in the national-political context, the Lebanese forces have realized the unity of the rifle in the ranks of the Lebanese resistance, have purged it of some of the filth that had become stuck to it, and have revealed in the conscience of the resisters the meaning of the resistance and the vision it is seeking to realize.

In the security-economic-development context, our area has been dominated by security, relaxation and confidence. Numerous matters in the context of transportation and vital streets and the provision of major basic goods for the citizens and factories have been dealt with.

In the foreign context, the Lebanese forces have conveyed the viewpoint of the Lebanese resistance to the international circles they have managed to get in contact and have a dialogue with, filling them in on the true picture of the two occupations, the Syrian and Palestinian ones, which Lebanon, and especially the Moslem group, are suffering from. The Lebanese forces have taken large steps in this context, and these circles have begun to understand the Lebanese cause clearly and deeply.

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/Question/ What are your views on the future of Lebanon, in the light of international variables?

/Answer/ Our experience with international variables has proved that no solution can be imposed on us from abroad. Everything that international politics have imposed as regards Lebanon has failed because it has been opposed to what the Lebanese resistance had made up its mind to do. In 1975 and 1976 the variables were aimed at having the Palestinians take the place of the Christians in Lebanon, and the scheme failed. In 1977 and 1978 the variables were aimed at having Syrian decision-making take the place of intrinsic Lebanese decisionmaking, and they failed too.

Today, as time has begun to show, it appears that the aim of the variables is to partition Lebanon. This tendency also will fail, because we want Lebanon to remain in its limits as specified in its constitution and as internationally recognized, as a country for all its people without exception.

/Question/ What is the goal in the Maronite conference held recently in New York?

/Answer/ The conference had no objectives except these which were explicitly declared.

It is natural that Lebanon should be devoting importance to this conference and that the conference should devote its entire attention to the matter and the destiny of Lebanon. The Maronites' relationship to Lebanon is not an ordinary one -- Lebanon has embraced Maronism and given the Maronites through history an inviolable sanctuary which has allowed them to survive, has saved their freedom and dignity, and has caused the Maronites to embrace Christianity in all its depth and become the hope of Eastern Christians.

An organic relationship of this type must prompt everyone concerned with the subject of the Orient and the Middle East to deepen his understanding of the reality of what has gone on there and is going on there and its history, so that it will be possible for them to determine the truth and recommend the proper solutions.

A United Army and a Divided People:

/Question/ In a speech in Kasrawan, you said "The grievous error was in permitting the Lebanese army to enter the 'Ayn al-Rummanah area. How did you manage to draw the army out and occupy its positions? What are the reasons for the repeated clashes with the Lebanese army?

(The port, al-Hadath, 'Ayn al-Rummanah and so on.)

/Answer/ The enemies keep giving out tendentious explanations and interpretations regarding our so-called enmity toward the Lebanese army. Is it at all reasonable that we should reject the national army?

The fact is:

First, the commanders of the Lebanese army tried, in a certain period, to mobilize this army against illusory dangers, in the hope of using it for purposes which did not greatly honor these commanders.

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Second, these commanders did not move, but have stayed still, and so far have not set out any plan whatever, to liberate the country from Syrian and Palestinian occupations.

Third, knowingly or not (in either case it is a great disaster), these commanders have striven to achieve the Syrian-Palestinian desire of dominating the free and liberated areas under a very thin veil of concern for legitimacy and the need to extend dominance over the liberated areas. It is as if Lebanese sovereignty is lacking among us but is dazzling in the occupied areas.

Fourth, no concern whatever has been shown by army commanders for the need to extend their presence in the occupied areas and stand as an obstacle to the terrorization, panicking and murdering of Lebanese there.

Fifth, the basic weak point which these commanders are still ignoring is that an army which is united from the structural standpoint is not necessarily united from the standpoint of reality. The army, in terms of officers and soldiers, who are among the scions of this people, is suffering from what it is suffering from -- how can a united army emerge from a divided people?

Therefore, since the start of the crisis in 1975, the Lebanese army has shown an obvious inability to perform its duties. This is not because of a lack of people, numbers, materiel or military expertise. Rather, the reason is in the vertical partition which is violating its conscience. Therefore, it has not been able to defend any area of Lebanon whatever, 'Ayn al-Rum manah, western Beirut, al-Damur, Sur, Bayt Mallat or Tripoli. Last but not least, I can assert to you that we have not fought the Lebanese army and do not have the intention of doing so, for how can someone fight himself? We have been and will remain opposed to all deviations in behavior and goals, whatever they are and wherever they are, over the length and breadth of the country.

/Question/ Is there a Lebanese-Lebanese dialogue? Have you arrived at a formula in this regard?

/Answer/ We for our part are most prepared to enter into any dialogue whatever with any Lebanese group whatever. We absolutely refuse to hold a dialogue with any stranger whoever who wants to appoint himself as a spokesman for any Lebanese group whatsoever.

On this basis, there is a Lebanese-Lebanese dialogue. It is proceeding on an explicit line which is entirely in agreement with our goals of preserving a free independent sovereign Lebanon.

Liberation from Dominance

/Question/ How do you view Ronald Reagan's victory in the American presidential campaign? Are you betting that the new American administration will bring Lebanon out of its trails? Do you expect an American initiative in the Middle East as an extension of Camp David or outside of Camp David in 1981?

/Answer/ I generally view things by two criteria: first, the principles of the International Declaration of Human Rights, and second, the triumph of the Lebanese cause

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(which is at the heart of these principles). Then I absolutely do not like to rush to judgment. The views which the Lebanese forces are concentrated on explicit facts and positions.

In another area, I firmly believe that bringing Lebanon out of its ordeal firstly and before all else depends on the will of the Lebanese, and nothing is the equivalent of that, except elements which are of maximum importance in causing solutions to fail or helping speed them up. The Lebanese will be complemented in their power only if the Moslem Lebanese take the historic decision we are waiting for from them, which is the will for liberation from Palestinian and Syrian dominance.

/Question/ There are people who talk of the "united kingdom" plan regarding a solution to the Palestinian cause. Do you believe that a solution of the cause at the expense of Lebanon is no longer at issue?

/Answer/ I consider that the Lebanese resistance is what has made the solution of the Palestinian cause at the expense of Lebanon fail. The resistance's continued perseverance and the concentration of resources for this perseverance, through the Moslems' support of it, will permanently eliminate any thought of any solution at the expense of Lebanon.

/Question/ Is it true that the Lebanese forces have decided to open new offices in the United States? Is there an understanding with the new American administration on opening these offices?

/Answer/ If the victory of the Lebanese cause requires more offices for the Lebanese forces, in the United States or in other countries, we are ready for that, while respecting the laws of the country where we work and confining ourselves to them entirely.

/Question/ When will Lebanese forces television start broadcasting?

/Answer/ When we consider that we have come to need it. The stations will be the most powerful there are, and the programs will be the best in terms of national guidance.

An Answer to Dean Iddah

/Question/ What is your view about Dean Raymond Iddah's statement to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that "A Maronite state cannot exist politically or economically in Lebanon and if the Syrian forces pull out of Lebanon suddenly the alternative must be international forces, or else the fighting among Lebanese will be terrible?"

/Answer/ Mr. Iddah, like some people, is taken in by the false rumors propagated by enemies of the Lebanese cause. Perhaps we have wondered about the extent to which Mr. Iddah has participated in spreading rumors of this kind through mocking positions and statements which have become unconnected to the Lebanese situation, from which the dean has been cut off for a long period. As regards the sudden withdrawal of the Syrian army and terrible fighting among Lebanese, the Lebanese will never fight one another if the Syrian army really and truly withdraws and if the Palestinians

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go back to their camps. I say that because the Syrians can really withdraw and wash their hands of any intervention whatsoever in our domestic affairs, or they can withdraw on the surface but remain in practice in the guise of al-Sa'iqah or the Palestine Liberation Army.

However, if the withdrawal is illusory, and if the Palestinians continue to occupy the Lebanese territory they occupy, then it will be the duty of the Lebanese resistance to do what its national conscience dictates.

/Question/ What statement would you like to conclude your talk to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI with?

/Answer/ Man is the enemy of what he does not know.

I am not amazed that the Arabs, or some of them at least, are taking a hostile stand toward the Lebanese cause, especially since the leftist-Syrian-Palestinian media, massive in resources, have to a very large extent contributed to forming a wayward Arab public opinion.

I am asking everyone, especially people responsible for objective media, to try to understand our reality not through enemies and conspirators but through sources which have the power to provide them with the naked facts.

Everyone has the right to arrive at the truth and it is the true right of everyone not to be vexed in reaching it.

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MOROCCO

ANALYSIS OF SAHARAN CONFLICT'S IMPACT ON COUNTRY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 pp 3389-3390

[Article: "The Saharan Affair Still Dominates Diplomacy and Domestic Policy"]

[Text] After the Decolonization Commission, the United Nations General Assembly on 12 November reaffirmed, by 88 votes against 8 and 43 abstentions, "the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence...as well as the legitimacy of the struggle that it is carrying out to exercise this right." Inviting the United Nations "to cooperate fully with the OAU with a view to making it possible for the Saharan people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence," it urgently requests Morocco "to undertake the dynamics of peace and to put an end to the occupation of the territory of West Sahara," as well as to join with the POLISARIO, "representative of the people of West Sahara... in undertaking direct negotiations leading to a definitive settlement of this matter.

The Moroccan authorities do not conceal their disappointment; but their information agencies, while affirming that the New York document will be ineffective and that the fatherland cannot again be divided, sharply criticize the countries that rejected the Moroccan thesis. According to AL ALAM, a daily that is very close to the position of the minister of foreign affairs, "most of the countries that supported the Algerian plan did so as a result of tribal concepts and of borders imposed by colonialism. They are countries where the will of the people is ignored, and where a single person governs and believes he can decide the destiny of a country and the unity of a people..." As for the countries that abstained, the same organ remarks that for the most part they have "an important stake in international policy and relations with both Morocco and Algeria. They are afraid to depart from their neutrality and to impair their relations with one of the two parties."

Moroccan public opinion moreover appears unsympathetic to this vote, foreseeable since the failure of the Moroccan-Senegalese proposal before the Decolonization Committee. It appears much more attentive to "news from the front," which during the entire duration of the New York debates featured the heightened activity of the royal armed forces and emphasized the results that they attained. The reference in the army dispatch of the Ohoud division, which carried the heaviest weight in

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the offensive operations of that period, ends by giving the impression of a decisive campaign. Also, in various Moroccan circles, it is hoped that the military matter will be definitively settled in a few months, and that a political solution can then take place.

After its failure in the United Nations General Assembly, Moroccan diplomacy should logically turn to the Organization of African Unity, which is qualified to settle what Rabat regards as a conflict between two member states, Morocco and Algeria. In fact in Freetown it renounced the policy of the "empty chair," which had been harmful to it; it can count on the active support of Senegal and Zaire; and, given the progressive orientation of the partisans of the POLISARIO, any reaction of an African country against the revolutionary dangers experienced in Africa, any governmental change involving a more conservative orientation may be worth an additional vote for Morocco. But experience seems to prove that it would be useless to expect an effective action from the OAU, one way or another.

But, according to Moroccan diplomacy, the Saharan affair depends completely on Algeria. In spite of the denials that have been made, everyone in Morocco is convinced that contacts have been made with this country, and that they have proved to be useful. Of course one was disappointed to ascertain that the approaches did not have any effect on the debates of the 4th Commission and of the United Nations General Assembly. And, contrary to the impression that was gained as a result of some indications in the month of October, one no longer thinks that the attitude of Algeria has now changed. But there is a conviction that it will, when the military successes of the Moroccan forces make it clear to the Algerian military staff that the struggle of the POLISARIO is at an impasse. Then the Algerian government will favor a negotiation that will make it possible to settle the Saharan matter in a few weeks.

Difficulties and Party Grievances

This optimism, however, is accompanied by a fear, already frequently expressed: namely, that the sacred union, created by the royal desire for recovery of the Sahara and manifested by the famous "Green March," no longer from then on having any reason to exist, will disappear and will give way to party rivalries.

The system of democratic representation, which Morocco is very proud of, seems to have experienced some wear and tear and manifests operational difficulties. The ISTIQLAL, inheritor of the great ALLAL AL FASSI tradition, an important political factor that makes it possible for the palace to avoid the twofold outbidding of intransigent nationalism and of militant Islam, was allocated a number of portfolios. This fact caused jealousy and criticism. In particular, one imputes to it the inability up to now of Moroccan diplomacy to gain acceptance of its point of view in the Saharan matter. In fact, Madame M'hamed Boucetta, who is minister of foreign affairs, is also the secretary general, that is the chief animator, of the ISTIQLAL.

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It is thus a "contradictory and shaky diplomacy" that the leftist rival of the ISTIQLAL, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, denounces with vigor; this "exaggerated pacifism would have ended by diverting even the traditional friends" of Morocco. A similar attitude would explain that neither at the time of the meetings of the OAU, nor within the United Nations, did Morocco find effective support. The ISTIQLAL organs up to now have responded only with nuances, and indirectly, because it would be difficult for them to be clearer without alluding to directives from the palace.

The ISTIQLAL, as Madame M'hamed Boucetta confirmed when interviewed at the beginning of November in a CARREFOUR [crossroads] radio broadcast, is all the same satisfied with having agreed to participate in the democratic experience launched in 1974-1975, in spite of the imperfections of the latter. It considers that it is a question of an "important step toward a totally democratic system." In fact, one must not separate oneself from the government too long...one must be informed, one must make his contribution, even a modest one..."

In the opposition, the disappointment of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces is now expressed openly. Its decision to participate in the municipal elections had won for its leaders the reproaches of many of the rank and file militants, who doubted the possibility of cooperating with the government, even at this modest echelon and in this nonpolitical sphere. Well, its weekly, LIBERATION, now repeats the difficulties in fact encountered in the exercise of their functions by the numerous municipal councils that the USFP directs totally or in part; and it indeed appears that the situation is judged in an analogous manner by the locally elected persons of the ISTIQLAL.

Contrary to the expectation of a number of these elected persons, the responsibilities with which they were invested were not matched with the resources, means, and powers that would have made it possible for them to correctly face the situation. In spite of the maneuvers that the USFP once again retroactively denounces with great vigor, the opposition was able to carry off a majority of the seats in several important cities: Fes, Agadir, Rabat, Sale, and certain Casablanca communities; but, either because of the enactment of new legislative or regulatory texts, or because of the behaviour of representatives of authority, the real scope of the councils has been greatly reduced with respect to the budget and in various other important spheres, such as the issuance of permits to build, civil defense, and public health. Moreover, the municipal councils did not have the personnel and the technical means needed for normal administration. Finally, since 1977, the administrators have been empowered to supervise all of the existing services in the provinces, which makes it possible for them to engage in unlimited local interventions.

The functioning of institutions is beginning to be contested also at the parliamentary level. The USFP deputies were not the only ones to protest against the manner in which the chairman of the chamber, Dey Ould Sidi Baba, interpreted the new measures, approved in May by referendum, which established the term of service at 3 years, as being applied retroactively and with exemption from having to comply with re-election.

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As for the great governmental party on which the government counted to balance the political system, that is, the National Group of Independents, it no longer seems to offer all of the stability that was hoped for a short while ago; the juxtaposition of those elected in the campaign, who expect a more social policy, and of the elected bourgeois who desire a return to investments, is revealed as artificial. Moreover, the "bourgeois" wing of this group, which still seems to be in the majority, for financial and economic reasons desires a quick end to the costly Saharan campaign. The independents nevertheless a short time ago had unanimously encouraged the king to launch the expedition; but at that time everyone thought that it would soon be over.

Moroccan public opinion in fact does not contest the principle of the "reunification" of the Saharan provinces; but the burden of the operation appears heavy to some, and if the army is the object of unanimous praise, the diplomatic conduct of the operation seems to be contested more and more.

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MOROCCO

BRIEFS

OIL SHALE--Fairies for Moroccan shale. The project for the exploitation of the bituminous shale of the Moroccan bed in Timahdit (see our most recent "I Have Learned") is arousing the enthusiasm of Arab financial institutions. "We will all be there," one of their directors confided in me. "We want to share in this great 'first' for the Third World." The anticipated financial budget for the first factory being on the order of \$3 billion, all cooperation will be welcome. The World Bank and OPEC funds will doubtless also be creditors. So many fairies around a cradle, even before the child is born. It's a good omen for Morocco. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 p 35] 8255

MOROCCAN TROOPS IN UAE--Two thousand Moroccan soldiers have left for the United Arab Emirates under orders of Col El Angri. Mission: to assure the security of the royal family. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 p 51] 8255

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SUDAN

COUNTRY SAID USING U.S. INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN LOANS

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Nov 80 p 43

/Article: "The Sudan Mediates with the White House To Obtain New Loans"/

/Text/ The Sudan is facing a stifling fiscal and economic crisis because it has no foreign currency at the present time. International and foreign commercial banks have refrained from lending to it when it began to fail to pay its debts at the end of 1978.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that President Ja'far Numayri talked at length with America's President Carter on this subject when he visited the United States last July.

The Sudanese president asked the American president personally to mediate with American banks to reschedule the debts and give international banks, which the United States dominates, an incentive to offer new loans to the Sudan.

The American president responded to the Sudanese president's request for several reasons, among them the fact that the Sudan is of great importance to Washington, which cannot leave the present regime there to face its destiny in a social and economic upheaval. It also does not want the Sudan to turn to the Kremlin again or rely totally on Arab Gulf aid, especially if the price is permanently to abandon the Sudan's uncertain position between the proponents and opponents of Camp David.

The White House's silent mediation with the American banks concerned was a success. They, in addition to West German banks and the Federation of Arab-French Banks, agreed to reschedule Sudanese loans worth \$600 million over 7 years. The transaction also included the offer of new loans to provide liquidity in foreign currency.

Britain is playing a role similar to America's, since it is exerting pressure on about 200 other creditors to reschedule their debts through the Morgan Grenville financial organization which the Sudan has authorized financial agent. Japan and the European Common Market countries agreed to reschedule Sudanese debts worth \$497 million last year.

Sudanese Central Bank experts say that the Sudan must pay at least the interest on its loans in order to retain a minimum of confidence of international banks;

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otherwise, it will receive no new loans, including a \$600-million one which the International Monetary Fund has agreed in principle to offer it over the next 3 years.

The Sudan had paid just \$1 million of its basic \$600 million in debts to American and European commercial banks in 1979, and refrained from paying the interest on these debts, which totalled \$100 million last year and will double this year.

The Sudan is linked to the United States by solid political bonds. It comes directly after Egypt in terms of the value of the aid received from Washington. Last fiscal year, ending September, that totalled \$125 million, and it is expected that it will reach \$130 million this year.

In American strategy, the Sudan constitutes an immense wall in the way of increasing Soviet ambitions from Ethiopia north along the waters of the Nile.

The Sudan's importance to America increased after Standard Oil Company of California discovered an oilfield producing 12,000 to 18,000 barrels a day in the southwest Sudan close to the borders of Chad.

The causes of the current financial crisis may be attributed to the ambitious development programs set out in the seventies, which were accompanied by poor agricultural planning, waste, extravagance, the flight of manpower, neglect of cotton cultivation and the problem of the Eritrean refugees.

The Sudanese government was compelled to accept the risks of an ascetic program imposed by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for the latest loan offered; this includes a program of belt tightening, reduction of the budget deficit, a halt to luxury imports, a drop in government subsidies of the prices of some basic commodities and incentives for cotton growing.

The basic challenge facing President Numayri's regime is exemplified by the avoidance of social and political disturbances resulting from the pursuit of an ascetic fiscal policy which does not enjoy popular support.

Sudanese Central Bank experts expect that the Sudan's current crisis will continue for a number of years, since its annual deficit ranges from \$500 to \$700 million and it needs \$400 million in foreign aid a year.

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TUNISIA

STATE CONTROL CONTINUES TO HAMPER ECONOMY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 pp 22-24

[Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Tunisia: State Control of the Economy Is Not Dead"]

[Text] Tunisia does not have the economic leadership it deserves. It cannot use its advantages wisely unless there is extensive reform geared to economic growth. Accelerated economic growth is essential to prevent increased unemployment, but it remains out of the question until governmental aims and the very structures of the state achieve a new coherence.

We reached these conclusions after talking on the scene to many Tunisians--ministers, businessmen, specialists, bankers, trade union officials and average citizens.

With its 6 million inhabitants, Tunisia has no other choice. The Maghreb does not exist economically; although Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's recent Algerian visit was very timely and successful, it did not change this long-standing situation.

Tunisia must opt for a larger arena, seeking international trade and foreign capital, with all the restraints that implies.

Mohamed Mzali's predecessor, Hedi Nouira, carried out such a policy for 10 years. Certainly, it can always be said that the tax and other incentives given to foreign investors (French, mainly) to locate in Tunisia were too generous.

It can be noted that some firms thus attracted had problems in their own country, more because of their management than their wages--considered too high--which they brought along.

Even if all this is true, there were results: 400,000 new jobs created between 1970 and 1980, as compared with 132,00 during the preceding decade. In the most negative assessment, these new jobs had no more impact than if they had been created in Europe for emigrants.

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Excessively Generous Tax Incentives

This extreme assessment remains to be proven, and it nonetheless true that these firms relocated on Tunisian soil and enabled Tunisia to learn about industrialization.

This industrialization is more durable than in many other comparable countries (Algeria, for example) because it is more modest, more realistic and better suited both to the abilities of Tunisian workers and the international economic situation. The Tunisian choice today has proven to be all the more judicious because wealthy European countries hurried, after the crisis, to shut their doors to immigration.

Tunisia's problem is that this remarkable effort, together with high growth rates and a rate of investment close to the tolerable maximum, has not been able to keep up completely with demographic pressures.

Thus, the "Nouira decade" (1970-1980) ended, according to official estimates, with a deficit of 130,000 jobs. Unemployment has risen substantially and is now, still according to official sources, 13.4 percent of the working population (off the record, higher percentages are mentioned.)

The future looks even more worrisome. Authorities predict that, during the 1980-1990 decade, 650,000 or 65,000 people a year will enter the job market.

To prevent rising unemployment from crossing dangerous social and political thresholds, the Tunisians must make greater efforts but at the same time they are tired of the austerity Mr Nouira imposed for 10 years. Mohamed Mzali is exploiting this feeling perhaps more than mere prudence would dictate.

The present talented prime minister, of course, is not an economist and many observers in Tunis fear he does not give economic matters the proper attention. Decisions have been made slowly or not at all since he has been in office.

The indispensable acceleration of economic growth can be achieved only by increased foreign capital. From this viewpoint, the team of Mansour Moalla and Abdelaziz Lasram--respectively minister of finance and plan and minister of the economy--is better placed than the technocrats of Hedi Nouira's time, because they have established relations with the rich Arab countries of the Gulf.

Administration Is the Dead Weight in This Country

In retrospect, the Nouira team has been criticized for being too pro-Western and not sufficiently pro-Arab. Indeed, contacts, talks and symposiums are increasing between Tunisians and Arab moneylenders, but paradoxically, the present Tunisian government still depends more than ever on French aid.

The increase in foreign capital--whether Arab, European or American (the latter is very rare)--raises a fundamental question which, if it is not forthrightly addressed, may endanger the final outcome of the efforts and sacrifices: the Tunisian economy is still largely under the state's control and high ranking officials say privately that "the administration is the dead weight in this

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country;" it is omnipresent and supercentralized, meddlesome and ineffective; that it is high time the state shift responsibility for economic tasks to real companies so it may concentrate more on its appropriate sectors (security, health and education.) If Tunisia takes the liberal option, for reasons mentioned above, then it must go all the way in order not to lose across the boards.

They Are Neither Gods Nor Saints

That is the sore point. After 20 years, Tunisian socialism has created unrealistic prices from the viewpoint of market laws, they handicap the growth of Tunisian firms. These unrealistic prices affect three areas vital to Tunisia's development.

The first is food; basic foodstuffs are sold below cost because of costly state subsidies. In fact, the entire agricultural issue must be thoroughly reviewed.

Tunisia has suffered what has been finally recognized as a common occurrence in developing and socialist countries--the universal disaster of the so-called agrarian reforms. Thus, it is astonishing that the Orientation Report for the Third Decade of Development (1980-1990), full of very judicious remarks, and put out by the Ministry of Finance and Plan in October 1980, only devotes 5 pages to agriculture out of a total of 218 pages.

Moreover, agriculture, which still employs almost half of the working population, is only allocated 13.6 percent of the investments in the Sixth Plan estimates.

It is even more disappointing since the first part of the report clearly criticizes the drawbacks of "cooperative dead weight which deals a severe blow to socialism and democracy."

We can even read: "The traditional, classic concept of cooperation is based on generous, but incorrect, ineffective ideas as long as men are men and not gods or saints!"

The second area is energy: consumer prices have lagged far behind the international evolution. This explains the wild growth in consumption and in energy-inefficient industrial installations. Stagnating petroleum production may cause Tunisia to become an importer of hydrocarbons by 1985. This reversal would be very difficult to take. It can be clearly seen that until now, the Tunisian economy has been favored and propelled by the successive increases in the price of black gold, since it was a net exporter of petroleum. Unless there are new, sizable discoveries, the high price of petroleum will soon work against Tunisia, which really does not need this additional handicap.

Tunis Could Replace Beirut, But...

Finally, money is the third area where prices are unrealistic: interest rates are relatively low because the money market is cut off from the outside world

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by exchange controls and the nonconvertibility of the dinar. This causes several inconveniences: saving is inadequately rewarded, waste is encouraged because profits on investments cannot be calculated and Tunisian capital leaves the country fraudulently because of exchange controls while foreign capital is not encouraged to come in, which is the direct opposite of governmental policy.

The authorities are aware of this contradiction. However, they have not decided to resolve it (See the remarks of Minister Moalla in "Jeune Afrique," issue 1035.) According to a high-ranking official of the Ministry of the Economy, they feel that ending exchange controls would result in a run on foreign currency which in a single stroke would deplete the reserves of the central bank. "We do not know how much capital the French have here," he explained to us, "and we fear they would take this opportunity to send large amounts of money back to France." Nevertheless, as long as Tunisia with its nonconvertible dinar seems like a snare for capital, it cannot expect the indispensable financial contributions from abroad.

After 20 years of state-controlled economy, it is not easy to reform the money and other unrealistic prices, even for men who claim to make the 1980-1990 decade the "decade of reforms." The authorities feel the Tunisian economy is "like a child" who must be protected until he reaches maturity. This overly paternalistic governing style may not truly correspond to the country's stage of development. It is possible that valuable opportunities are passed up. We will give only one example: an international financial place is needed to replace Beirut; Tunis could reasonably be a contender if the dinar was convertible.

To make true reforms, the governmental team must be bolder and have more authority. It is not so much the members of Mzali's cabinet who are called into question but the current Tunisian political structure and its obvious archaism.

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